

| CYCLONE Preparedness Lessons Learned 2018



| Cyclone preparedness – 2018 highlights

- No cyclones in 2018, but a lot of scenario indicators
 - 70% refugee shelters damaged during '17 Cyclone Mora
 - 4 cyclone early warnings triggered in '18
 - More landslides than wind storms reported in '18 – but more people affected by wind storms
 - '18 Cyclone Titli did not hit – but affected almost 2,000

| CYCLONE Preparedness - overall

- The international community is much better prepared for a cyclone in Cox's Bazar area than in May 2018
- Improved infrastructure in the camp and relocations of thousands of the most vulnerable have reduced some baseline risk
- Establishment of substantial stockpiles, engineering capacity and additional warehousing space will improve initial response time

Progress in natural hazard and disaster risk management from 2018 to 2019

January 2018	January 2019
Overarching cyclone response plan	
No sector response plans	
No camp-level response plans	
No historical record of hazards	
9,660 households estimated to be at great landslide/ flash flood risk	
No cyclone early warning system in the camps; no landslide early warning system in the camps	
Lack of clarity on shelter windload capacity; no evacuation plan for cyclone	

Progress in natural hazard and disaster risk management from 2018 to 2019

January 2018	January 2019
Overarching cyclone response plan	Overarching cyclone response plan; overarching monsoon plan
No sector response plans	All sectors have first draft response plans
No camp-level response plans	All camps have monsoon response plans; most have first draft cyclone response plans
No historical record of hazards	8 months' record of hazardous incidents
9,660 households estimated to be at great landslide/ flash flood risk	5,948 households at great landslide/flash flood risk relocated to safer areas
No cyclone early warning system in the camps; no landslide early warning system in the camps	Cyclone early warning extended to all 34 camps with 1,800 volunteers; landslide early warning diagnosed as difficult in context
Lack of clarity on shelter windload capacity; no evacuation plan for cyclone	Majority of structures in the camp identified to have max. windload capacity of >50 km/hr; no evacuation plan for cyclone

2018 Lessons Learnt & Key Recommendations

- Baseline vulnerability both for Rohingya and the entire district remain extremely high
- Focus on initial response planning – phasing, access control, emergency comms, ECR;
- Strengthen health, protection and communications systems;
- Clarify planning and integration with overall /division-wide response;

- 1. Early Warning and community Engagement**
- 2. Camp level mitigation and preparedness**
- 3. First 72-hour response**
- 4. Mobile response teams**

| 1. Early Warning and community Engagement

- Early warning system (CPP) established but learning challenges in adapting to the camp settlement (all camps)
- Cyclone Titli highlighted information gaps in terms of the getting the same message at the same time to all stakeholders
- Working to test and strengthen protocols for information dissemination (Cyclone Gaja experience)
- CPP continuing to expand number and size of CPP teams and capacities for more engagement and monitoring
- Adding VHF capacity into the CiC Office's would strengthen emergency communications capacities in camps

| 1. Early Warning and community Engagement

- Early action and preparedness messages are in place but distribution plans and sensitization needs to be strengthened through more engagement of all partners
- Large scale evacuations in KTP remain impossible and panic a real threat – messaging has to be reinforced and sustained
- More attention for training staff on how to contextualize and explain the messages around hazard and risk
- A sustained effort through CwC is required throughout the year

1. Early Warning and community Engagement

“We thought winter is here. There might not be any cyclone. If there is a cyclone, we want announcement in advance so that we can prepare ourselves. We have heard from BRAC, CIC, in the mobile news and in the radios that it will be raining and that there are signals available and we must be careful. I am worried for those who doesn't have access to devices. They might need more information. Some women who don't have men in their household have no access to this information.”



(Male, 50, Camp 4)



“There is a storm coming next week I heard. There will be heavy wind and rain. Our houses are made of tarpaulin and bamboo and are not strong enough. We made these houses when we arrived here. These are not in a good condition. In the radio, we heard and heard from mosque the information of storm. We got scared... Because it was raining, there was no sun. We couldn't charge our solar panel, so we had to be in dark. We want more clear information about the signal system and its preparedness.”

(Male, 28, Camp 2W)

“We have no idea who are responsible for announcing about cyclone and we don't know who to go and ask for further information related to this. We just hear things from the shops, bazaar or mosque and sometimes these are not reliable.”



(Female, 33, Camp 2E)

Source: Internews – snapshot from Cyclone Titli

| 2. Camp-level planning

- Camp level plans have been developed but are not standardized and are not fully aligned with overall planning, with critical gaps remaining.
- There is still misconceptions about the safety of facilities and likely hazards
- Limited relief supplies have been pre-positioned in around the camp but distribution is un-even
- For storm-surge areas in Teknaf, evacuation plans need to be clarified between CiCs and local government

| 3. First 72-hour response

- Access clearance may take several days.
- Roads in the camp remain vulnerable to temporary blockages and some routes are not completed
- More remote areas of the camp away from roads run a real risk of receiving delayed/limited amounts of aid
- Congestion of aid workers into camps could easily cause chaos – one truck/vehicle breaking down, getting stuck could cause massive delays
- Communications will be disrupted limiting flow of information

| 3. First 72-hour response

- With limited access, staff will need to stay in Ukhiya and Teknaf close to the camps to be effective
- Role of volunteers groups (CPP/SUV/PERU, etc.) will be critical to manage the initial response within the community
- Coordination with the Armed Forces Division (AFD) will be critical to access logistics and communications capacity

| 4. Health and mobile response teams

- Baseline lack of trauma care facilities and surgical capacity
- Multiple field hospitals are not cyclone-proof and will need to be shut down temporarily, others may be at risk for damage
- Ambulance dispatch and control systems still being confirmed, lack of radio communication
- With access limited, health will be heavily reliant on mobile response teams which have limited capacity and remain untested
- Other mobile teams (WASH, Protection) work will need to support and complement the health response

| CYCLONE Operations Plan – Health

- Prepositioning of safe water, and water purification/treatment items for health facilities will be a challenge
- Post-cyclone disease outbreak remains one of the biggest risks, requiring additional layers of contingency plans
- Battening down and rapidly re-opening health facilities will be a major challenge. Additional capacity from Emergency Health Teams (national, global) may be required.

Risks remain....



After Nor'Wester storm 25th February, camp 18. (Photo credit: IOM)



Cyclone and Monsoon Lessons Learnt Doc

Download the Monsoon report:

http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/environment_energy/extreme-weather-and-disaster-preparedness-in-the-rohingya-refuge.html

Download the Cyclone preparedness report (to be published 15th March):

<http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library.html>



| THANK YOU!

