For many international relief organizations and donors funding humanitarian responses globally, Haiyan represents a turning point for emergency cash transfer programming (CTP). It is during the response to this large-scale, rapid onset disaster in 2013-2014 that many of the conceptual principles and added value attributed to CTP were applied and observed at scale.

This report documents good practices, lessons, and recommendations from the perspectives of a wide group of CTP actors and stakeholders. It also documents the institutionalization and preparedness efforts that have been undertaken by key stakeholders in humanitarian CTP, including the Government of the Philippines, the Cash Working Group (CWG) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

Fe Kagahastian and Betty Kweyu

January 2014-June 2015
Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all the cash transfer practitioners, UN agencies and NGOs, who took part in a two-day UNICEF-UNOCHA sponsored learning workshop in Tacloban in November 2014, on the one-year anniversary of the Yolanda response. All their contributions were invaluable in this documentation of the Haiyan cash programming experience.

Both authors would also like to acknowledge the unwavering support of key people from their respective organizations. On UNICEF’s side: Lotta Sylwander, UNICEF Country Representative; Margaret Sheehan, Chief of Field Operations; Maulid Warfa, Chief of Field Office, Tacloban; and Augusto Rodriguez, UNICEF’s Chief of Social Policy Section. On OCHA’s side: David Carden, Head of Office, the core staff of OCHA Philippines, and the cash champions within OCHA’s global offices in Geneva and New York.

Special mention goes to DSWD, home to the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (colloquially referred to as the 4Ps) and the National Household Targeting Office, whose dedicated staff across levels opened up themselves and their systems to collaborative work with humanitarian actors to scale and speed up cash assistance at a critical time. Similarly to LGU officials (many of whom were also survivors) across the Haiyan affected areas, who partnered with humanitarian agencies and actors to deliver cash assistance to thousands of Filipinos throughout the emergency response and until today.

Last but not least, the authors dedicate this report to the resilient Filipinos, who, despite suffering tremendous loss, patiently and generously answered dozens of questions from enumerators, evaluators, researchers, monitors, often with a warm smile—your indomitable spirit is truly inspirational!

MABUHAY AT MARAMING SALAMAT PO!

Betty and Fe

About the Authors

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The views expressed in this document, and any error, belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations they represented during the Typhoon Haiyan response.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CaLP</td>
<td>Cash Learning Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Cash Transfer Programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Cash Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFAC</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Family Access Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILEEP</td>
<td>DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOLE</td>
<td>Department of Labour and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industries (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERPWG</td>
<td>Emergency Response Preparedness Working Group (OCHA Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP</td>
<td>Financial Service Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYC</td>
<td>“Know your Customer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Post-distribution Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADD</td>
<td>Sex and Age Disaggregated Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESDA</td>
<td>Technical Education and Skills Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>Unconditional Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Today, the question is no longer: “Is cash an appropriate modality of humanitarian response?” The question we’re now trying to answer is: “How can we implement cash transfer programming better in future emergencies?”

– Maulid Warfa
Haiyan
Chief of Field Office
UNICEF

1. Introduction

1.1 Report Overview

This report is a documentation of the overall lessons learnt and good practices in cash transfer programming (CTP) as experienced during the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) humanitarian response. The contents of this paper, including the recommendations, are a product of collaborative efforts and draws from the following:

(a) Lessons Learnt Workshop, 18-19 Nov. 2014¹. UNICEF and UNOCHA conducted this event jointly in Tacloban City, one year after Yolanda struck. The workshop drew participation from more than 50 representatives of humanitarian agencies, which implemented CTP at different stages throughout the response.

(b) Institutionalization and preparedness initiatives, Dec. 2014-April 2015. These were a series of events and activities that the Government of the Philippines, UNICEF, OCHA, the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), and the Cash Working Group embarked on to ensure that the learning on CTP during Yolanda are institutionalized within the formal response frameworks in the Philippines; and are translated into concrete preparedness activities.

(c) Insights and perspectives of the cash focal points of UNICEF and UNOCHA informed by their strategic vantage points during the Yolanda response and their direct engagements with local stakeholders: government, private sector, local NGOs, and disaster-affected Filipinos.

¹ See Annex A: workshop agenda and participants’ list
1.2 Report Objectives
This documentation of good practices, lessons and recommendations aims to:

(a) Facilitate a more efficient, effective, and accountable implementation of CTP in future emergencies in the Philippines, leveraging the experience and knowledge from Haiyan;

(b) Enable local actors to build on the learning and advances made during Yolanda for preparedness and institutionalization activities;

(c) Provoke continued discussions and preparedness activities around establishing an inclusive coordination structure for emergency CTP in the Philippines that could facilitate a rapid, responsible, respectful and more harmonized response at the appropriate scale;

(d) Be a catalyst for creative partnerships, collaborative relations and solid coordination between and across traditional and non-traditional humanitarian actors that would foster innovations and forge joint tools, preparedness and response protocols, with the ultimate goal of collectively delivering assistance that is meaningful to crisis-affected Filipinos; and

(e) Capture what may be applicable to other humanitarian contexts.

1.3 Scope and Limitations
Scope and Timeframe. Broadly, this document captures CTP experiences as shared by agencies for programmes implemented during the period between December 2013 and November 2014. It also covers CTP institutionalization, preparedness activities, and advocacy with various stakeholders from December 2014 through April 2015.

Limitations. This document is not a comprehensive evaluation based on a scientific research methodology. Lessons learnt, good practices, and the recommendations in this report are based on country-specific context and experiences as shared by a diverse group of cash actors engaged in the Typhoon Haiyan response.

Whilst there has been an increasing uptake of emergency CTP globally in the past decade, there is a widely accepted perception that Typhoon Yolanda has been a game changer—not only for the Government of the Philippines (GoP) and the people of the Philippines, but also for the broader humanitarian community.

The questions as to (i) whether the CTP experience in Haiyan would prompt a global shift towards more hybrid cash and prepositioned in-kind aid in future emergency response; or (ii) whether the international humanitarian coordination system would take the use of CTP at scale in Haiyan as an imperative to re-evaluate how cash fits within it, are beyond the scope of this report.

This document incorporates perspectives from local actors, including government, private sector and disaster affected Filipinos. However, it does not venture into interpreting the overall impact of CTP on the disaster-affected Filipinos, who received cash assistance.

The succeeding sections of the report are organized as follows:

- **Section 2**: Gives an overview of CTP in Haiyan, highlighting the enabling, country-specific factors that led to the use of CTP at scale, and some of the programmatic
considerations that led to agencies’ decisions around cash programming, as shared in the workshop;

- **Section 3:** Reflects on good practices, lessons learnt, and recommended next steps, based on workshop discussions, institutionalization initiatives, and a number of reports, evaluations, and key informant interviews;

- **Section 4:** Presents the institutionalization activities initiated by UNICEF and UNOCHA in the months following the November 2014 workshop in collaboration with DSWD, and the Philippines’ Cash Working Group and Humanitarian Country Team.

- **Section 5:** Shares concluding remarks; and

- **Annex Section:** Consolidates and centralizes key Haiyan documents relevant to cash transfer programming as reference for future emergency response.
2. Cash Transfer Programming in Haiyan: An Overview

Box 1. YOLANDA FAST FACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 million</td>
<td>Filipinos affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Registered deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 million</td>
<td>Filipinos displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>Houses damaged or destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9 million</td>
<td>Workers, who lost income sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 million</td>
<td>Family food packs distributed from November to December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34,498</td>
<td>Households provided with cash in exchange for community works along disaster relief operation; intervention worth more than PHP 21 million2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>Households provided with tents, plastic sheeting, mats, blankets, and cooking sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>Households provided tools, construction materials, and technical guidance to repair their own homes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts, consolidated as of 28 July 2014, OPARR

2.1 Context-specific Enabling Factors

When Super Typhoon Haiyan, locally known as Yolanda, struck the Philippines on 8 Nov. 2013, global stakeholders, donors and proponents of cash transfer programming (CTP) recognized an opportunity in the convergence of the right factors to test CTP as a potentially more effective form of humanitarian assistance. The Philippines became a test bed for scaling up emergency cash transfer in an environment that’s uniquely conducive to it based on the following enabling factors:

- A middle income, disaster-prone country struck by the strongest typhoon in recorded history—a sudden onset calamity that required a swift and scaled-up response;
- A strong government whose resources had been depleted by an earthquake and an insurgency attack just months before Yolanda;
- A national social protection programme delivered through cash transfers;
- A robust private sector already mobilized in previous smaller-scale disasters;
- A resilient population highly sensitized to cash transfer, receiving over US$2 billion worth of remittance every month3;
- A group of financial service providers (remittance agencies, pawnshops, postal system, door-to-door courier, mobile network operators) with long-standing relationships with Filipinos in both urban and rural settings4;

---

2 The Philippine Peso (PHP) to US dollars exchange rate: 1 PHP=45.26 USD, as published online by Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, also known as BSP (Central Bank of the Philippines). Accessed 16 June 2015:

3 Remittance coursed through banks, as regularly reported online by the BSP: www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm

4 This diverse group of financial service providers is unique to the Philippines as part of a remittance industry catering to millions of Filipino overseas workers regularly sending money and care packages to families in the Philippines.
• A well-integrated market system with strong regional links across suppliers, traders, retailers, local marketplaces and community merchants and shopkeepers, with whom Filipinos in the low-income bracket (who tend to be amongst the more vulnerable after shocks) have the suki\(^5\) relationship;

• A strong group of civil society organizations: local NGOs, faith-based organizations, rural cooperatives, community groups and networks, who actively participate in community-based advocacy and monitoring;

• Permanent presence of UN and international agencies in the country.

In addition to these enabling factors, Haiyan pushed two global-level triggers that put in motion a massive mobilization of financial, logistical and human resources, and an outpouring of support to the Philippines from around the world:

• The Government of the Philippines’ (GoP) formally requesting assistance from the international humanitarian community; and

• The declaration of Haiyan as a Level 3 emergency\(^6\) by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.\(^7\)

### 2.2 CTP and the Transformative Agenda

Yolanda marked the first Level three (L-3) emergency declared by the IASC in the context of a large scale, sudden-onset disaster. As such, there was a strong global push to test out in this context the implementation of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle under the Transformative Agenda\(^8\), in order to capture important lessons that can be leveraged to improve the system for future emergencies of similar context.

This new process triggered a set of protocols meant to deliver a response that is more cost-efficient, better coordinated and more accountable to the affected populations.

Over the past decade, the use of cash transfers in emergencies has become an increasingly common form of humanitarian assistance. Globally, delivering cash has become widely accepted as a far more dignified alternative to the traditional in-kind model, as it honors the rights of crisis-affected households enabling them prioritize and meet multiple needs, while stimulating local markets. As such, CTP is widely viewed to be aligned with the objectives and principles of the Transformative Agenda.

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\(^5\) A traditional practice, especially in peri-urban and rural areas, whereby Filipinos will promise to regularly buy from, or be loyal customers of certain vendors/peddlers/merchants, or sari-sari store owners, who sell the food and non-food items they need. The vendor rewards the consumer’s loyalty by offering in return a good discount or bargain. This relationship, called suki, is part of the culture and is a common practice within local marketplaces and community sari-sari shops (very small shops).

\(^6\) A categorization that gives a broader push from humanitarians to have a more predictable, accountable and cost-efficient response; it requires a system-wide mobilization to significantly increase the scale of the response and improve the overall effectiveness of assistance.


\(^8\) The IASC Transformative Agenda is a series of concrete actions that aim to visibly transform the way in which the humanitarian community responds to a crisis. It focuses on improving the timeliness and effectiveness of collective response through better leadership and coordination structures and greater accountability to the affected people. Accessed 15 June. [www.humanitarianresponse.info/topics/transformation-agenda](http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/topics/transformation-agenda)
Recognizing the Philippines context as uniquely conducive to cash, and in consideration of CTP’s potential to facilitate rapid relief to disaster survivors at scale, donors and the international humanitarian community set in motion an overwhelming cascade of emergency support, from funds, to in-kind relief goods, to waves of technical experts, including cash specialists, through various surge mechanisms.

2.3 CTP as a Response Modality in Haiyan: A Snapshot

On the whole, evaluations and post distribution monitoring feedback indicate that the cash infusion contributed to: food security, the repair/ (re)construction of damaged houses, recovery of lost income and livelihoods, and helped speed up children’s return to school, and families’ efforts to regain normalcy.9

To provide an overview of CTP in Haiyan, OCHA shared some figures extrapolated from the 3Ws10 matrix and some highlights from the final Periodic Monitoring Report released in October 2014, as well as the Financial Tracking System (FTS).

Facts and Figures

- At least 45 international humanitarian agencies had cash-based interventions in Haiyan.11
- At least 1.4 million disaster survivors, or 277,000 households received cash assistance worth US$34 million11 during the emergency phase.
- Cash transfer components comprised an estimated 40% of the total value of humanitarian assistance for Haiyan worth around $845 million13.

Types

- Unconditional cash transfer (UCT)
- Conditional cash transfer (CCT)
  - Cash-for-Work (CfW)
  - Cash-for-Asset (CFA)
- Voucher
  - Unconditional14
  - Conditional

---

9 Periodic Monitoring Reports, Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation, Post-distribution Monitoring results (IFRC, PRC, Oxfam, UNICEF), Focus Group Discussions conducted by DfID and OCHA.
11 Source: the consolidated 3W matrix: Dec. 2013-Aug. 2014. This data excludes other actors known to have distributed cash: e.g. govt., private companies, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Filipinos overseas
12 Estimated based on figures reported by WFP, UNICEF, IFRC/PRC, OXFAM.
14 As reported in consolidated 3Ws matrix mainly by agencies with CTP for food security in areas where (super)markets/department stores were functional during the emergency response.
If there’s such a thing as a perfect environment for emergency cash transfer, it would be the Philippines. But what that means is it might be impossible to replicate what we did here elsewhere.”

– IFRC
Cash Delegate

General Breakdown

- conditional
- unconditional

23%
77%

Sectoral Objectives | Clusters

- Stabilize food security | Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC)
- Improve immediate shelter | Shelter Cluster
- Income generation; livelihoods recovery | Early Recovery and Livelihoods (ER&L)
Box 2. Tzu Chi Foundation

Within the first two weeks after Yolanda struck, while traditional aid agencies were conducting needs and market assessments across the devastated areas, the Taiwan-based Buddhist charity, TzuChi Foundation was implementing a massive cash-for-work intervention in Tacloban city and its environs, mobilizing thousands of Filipinos to clear up tons of debris blocking major roads. Each participant was paid PhP500 per day, nearly double the daily minimum wage in the region. At its peak, the CFW programme, which lasted from November 20 to December 8, had over 31,000 participants per day working a total of 289,000, day shifts.

Traditionally, aid agencies implement CTP after they’ve assessed that the use of cash is accepted, that markets are accessible and that functional payment mechanisms exist. In this light, TzuChi’s intervention was criticized by some humanitarian actors for doing harm by not adhering to the traditional pre-implementation norms, as well as for distorting the regional minimum wage rates. However, amongst affected communities and municipalities, the rapid, no-regrets approach adapted by TzuChi was hailed as a success in helping Filipinos recover quickly. The cash injection was reported to have revived markets functions by attracting traders from outside of the affected areas. The new traders created new markets, providing an early semblance of security and normalcy to disaster survivors.

Source: TzuChi Foundation; ReliefWeb
3. Good Practices, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

This section identifies good practices and lessons learnt, and provides concrete recommendations in seven focus areas reflecting the workshop session outcomes: Resource Mobilization, Rapid Needs Assessments, Targeting, Market Systems, The Journey of Cash, Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM), and Coordination. Recommendations under each focus area are primarily preparedness activities that require political commitment and time from several stakeholders, who would need to consult, collaborate and coordinate.

3.1 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

Highlights

Resource mobilization efforts informed by the cash conduciveness context of the Philippines is in itself a good practice replicable elsewhere, and an indication that the international community is evolving away from the one-size-fits-all response approach. However, surge deployments, even in a sudden-onset emergency the scale of Yolanda, must not result in a deluge of experts; rather, it must be well-calibrated to complement what is already existing in the country. The following are recommendations that could optimize the potential of context-specific human resource mobilization to translate into appropriately phased out cash-based interventions during and even before an emergency.

Table 3.1: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.1</td>
<td>High-level consideration of cash very early on as an appropriate response modality specific to the Philippine context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The early recognition of the Philippines by donors and the humanitarian community as a highly conducive environment for CTP came soon after the forecast of super typhoon Haiyan, and at a time when there was already a global uptake of CTP as an effective response tool in emergency and rehabilitation contexts. This high-level early consideration of cash as appropriate to the country-context resulted in a cascade of pro-cash decisions, including the rapid mobilization of donor funding in support of cash-based emergency interventions, and surge deployment of cash experts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L 3.1</td>
<td>Waves of different surge experts during the immediate relief phase, particularly related to cash programming, became an impediment to more coordinated approaches. Each wave of surge experts had varying opinions on what needed to be prioritized. There was also no systematic way of handover from one surge expert to the next; and more importantly, no systematic way of knowledge transfer to national actors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While individual agencies attributed the success of their emergency CTP to surge capacity, the combined presence of a considerable number of expatriates at the onset of the response overwhelmed local systems and stakeholders. There was an unprecedented contingency of technical experts brought in amongst the first waves of surge deployments tasked to look into CTP. However, this did not compensate for the overall lack of deeper knowledge of the country’s context and existing mechanisms, which likely precluded some from designing the most appropriate cash intervention in the earliest phase. Moreover, the revolving door of experts (not only on cash) led to disjointed ways of working, given the lack of standardized ways of handing over. This is particularly significant for CTP as it requires a higher level of coordination (intra-, inter- agency, intra-, inter-, cross cluster) and without it, cash-programmes could quite easily fall short, or even do harm to the affected population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>When?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R 3.1a</td>
<td>Establish an in-depth “Cash Country Profile” for the Philippines as part of data preparedness.</td>
<td>OCHA, CWG, CaLP</td>
<td>Preparedness timeframe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resources are better mobilized when there is a good understanding before an emergency of the country’s local stakeholders/actors and their capacity for scaling up cash transfer programming. An ideal starting point is post-Haiyan, although this could include a brief on each past emergency when CTP was used prior to Yolanda. The profile could be the one-stop shop for CTP in the Philippines, including: all existing government guidelines issued during Haiyan that could be built upon; a brief including some analysis on the roles of relevant government agencies, financial service providers (FSPs), the private sector and other existing mechanisms and stakeholders relevant to CTP as experienced in Haiyan. It would also be useful to include an analysis of what are feasible, strategies for humanitarian agencies engagement in a more purposeful way, in creative partnerships with other key local actors in a future emergency CTP response, either in participatory community monitoring, or as payment conduits (e.g. local NGOs, faith-based groups, Microfinance Institutions [MFIs] that provide loans to sari-sari store owners, cooperatives, rural banks that cater to smallholder farmers, fisherfolk, etc.). Incorporate secondary data from development partners where available, for example from UNDP, or the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group focused exclusively on the private sector in developing countries.

OCHA Philippines is in the process of creating a knowledge-sharing platform on the humanitarianresponse site that could be the home of the Cash Country Profile and all other tools and documents related to CTP in the Philippines. CaLP Asia is establishing a site dedicated to the Philippines Cash Working Group (CWG) and there is an agreement to ensure that both sites are well linked. These two resources, if well-linked, would be a good starting point, particularly for international surge staff.

16 Langdon Greenhalgh et al, Real-time Evaluation of the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Response, Feb.-March 2014. (Commissioned by IFRC and the Undersecretary General, Programme Services Division.)
18 A sari-sari store is a convenience store. The Filipino word sari-sari literally means "variety". Such stores form an important economic and social location in a Filipino community. It is present in almost all neighborhoods, sometimes even on every street. Most sari-sari stores are privately owned shops and are operated inside the shopkeeper’s house.
donors, and external audiences, but they should continually be updated and aspire to be the one-stop shop for CTP in the Philippines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R 3.1b</th>
<th>Stagger funding for surge experts’ visits throughout the humanitarian programme cycle, especially during preparedness.</th>
<th>Donors, HAs</th>
<th>Preparedness timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on the experience in Haiyan, the overwhelming footprint of specialists overrode existing capacities and also resulted in disjointed ways of working across the board. This could be mitigated by funding cash specialists to come and lend their expertise and boost in-country capacity during preparedness. The Philippine Red Cross was able to implement its largest scale cash response to date in Haiyan due to investments in preparedness activities supported by IFRC and donors. PRC’s preparedness work covered staff capacity building (trainings, technical visits), establishment of CTP standard operating procedures, guidelines and other operational tools.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R 3.1c</th>
<th>Prioritize deployment of cash experts with regional experience and/or in-depth knowledge of the country</th>
<th>HAs, roster systems</th>
<th>Response mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Despite the conduciveness of the Philippines to CTP, cash transfer as a response modality is still fairly new, particularly for the government. Cash transfer experts are certainly needed to enhance systems, provide training on many key programming processes. However, based on the experience in Haiyan, donors and agencies must endeavor to bring international expertise during preparedness when there is time to develop/enhance systems and procedures. In mobilizing surge capacity for emergency response, every effort must be taken to prioritize deployment of experts with experience in the region and/or in-depth knowledge of the Philippine culture and government systems.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 RAPID NEEDS AND MARKET ASSESSMENTS

**Highlights**

- Overall, rapid needs and market assessments reflected cash unequivocally as a priority need, and cash transfers as a viable form of assistance in Haiyan.

- In this phase of the response, OCHA set up an assessment registry in the dedicated Haiyan humanitarianresponse website and encouraged agencies to share the results of their assessments. In all, there were more than 200 different assessments uploaded onto the site. This, combined with the perceived deluge of foreign nationals with various sectorial, technical expertise and systems, created a massive footprint that led to the unintended consequence of overwhelming the government mechanisms, particularly the Local Governance Units (LGUs), some of whom were also victims of Yolanda.

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• Another challenge was that the inter-agency MIRA mechanism, which provides a coordinated framework for rapid needs assessment, was not cash-ready and did not yet include market considerations.

• While this was rectified in MIRA II, through advocacy by CaLP, OCHA and the Cash Working Group, the experience in Haiyan highlights the need for global advocacy to integrate cash into inter-agency assessment and response analysis tools and systems.

The MIRA is a key tool in the “coordinated approach to the assessment of an emergency and to the prioritization of the needs of affected people...”

– IASC Humanitarian Programme Cycle

Table 3.2: RAPID NEEDS AND MARKET ASSESSMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.2</td>
<td>Drawing cash out as a priority need in rapid assessments and incorporating cash transfer and market considerations in response recommendations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agencies with CTP experience conducted assessments that drew out cash as among the affected communities’ priority needs in the early days. This was promptly followed up with market assessments/analyses that determined the conditions of market places, what basic commodities were available, and if communities, traders and suppliers could access them. The general conclusion of these assessments was that cash-based interventions were an appropriate option. This may be an indication as to how cash and markets have been well integrated into many individual agencies humanitarian response toolboxes and as such, their findings were reflective of the realities on the ground at that critical time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L-3.2</td>
<td>CTP, when not built into existing inter-agency tools as a response modality, could lead to disjointed response analysis and planning and a compromised response strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although dozens of individual rapid assessments reflected cash unequivocally as a priority need and cash transfer as a viable form of assistance, this was somewhat watered down in the first MIRA report. (See Box 4: Cash and The MIRA)

This gap in the MIRA tool was identified by both the interim OCHA Cash Coordinator and the CaLP Technical Coordinator deployed on surge to the Philippines in November 2013. And while they were able to incorporate some market considerations into the questionnaire for the second round of MIRA, this scenario highlights how current IASC tools are not fit for purpose.
Develop a MIRA tool contextualized to the Philippines based on learning in Haiyan; consider roles for key government agencies, private sector, and local actors with proven track record of delivering in an emergency.

HCT, tasking ERPWG and CWG

Within preparedness timeframe

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) could initiate a review of the MIRA tool for the Philippines to incorporate the overall lessons in Haiyan. The HCT could task both the Emergency Response Preparedness Working Group (ERPWG) and the Cash Working Group (CWG) to collaborate and ensure the MIRA is configured to accommodate cash transfer programming as an appropriate emergency response modality even during the early phase of a large-scale catastrophe, as seen in Yolanda. Incorporate market considerations. Using the contextualized MIRA coordination framework, agree on agency roles and responsibilities and pilot the newly developed inter-agency tool during preparedness.

February 2014. Guiuan, the Philippines. Emergency cash assistance provided to most vulnerable families hit by Typhoon Haiyan. Thirty-five-year-old Vivencia Plaba was among those who received assistance. She shared how she will use the money she had just received. "I will definitely buy food, especially viands and if I have some money left, some clothes for the children." Source: OCHA/Gemma Cortes
Box 3. Cash as part of priority needs and response recommendations for Yolanda in rapid assessments conducted by individual agencies

**OXFAM, 16 Nov. 2013: Typhoon Yolanda Rapid Needs Assessment**
- Support the resumption of local markets or creation of emergency markets to affected municipalities. Related to this, cash for work (CfW) can be explored for community clean up.

**ADRA Philippines, 23 Nov. 2013: Typhoon Yolanda Rapid Needs Assessment**
- **Cash vouchers preferred over food packs.** Focus group discussions with survivors revealed that while they are grateful for the food packs received immediately after the storm, they are now ready to determine how assistance provided by donors would be better directed to them. When the option of a cash transfer through cash vouchers was presented, participants applauded and cheered with enthusiasm. Survivors said that they can determine what to do with a voucher that has the value of cash.
- Financial capital and material support are the top expressed needs to recover livelihoods.

**Save the Children, 29 Nov. 2013: Typhoon Yolanda Market Assessments for Boat Building Inputs**
- **Cash Transfer (Vouchers or Cash) to affected Small/Medium Boat Owners**
  As the supplies for boat materials are available in the market with no major foreseen challenges or major blockages, CTP appears to be a relevant response option. It is suggested to focus on small and medium boat owners as: (a) they are less likely to have access to affordable credit; and (b) medium boat owners still employ crew and the fishing industry also provides jobs for petty traders etc. and so repair of these boats will still have a multiplier effect.

**HelpAge International, 4 Dec. 2013:**
- **Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods First Phase Rapid Assessment Report**
  - There is a predictably high dependence on relief aid indicating that livelihoods recovery operations should begin as soon as possible to avoid a widening food gap when relief is scaled down. Cash-for-Work programmes could be a useful tool to help fill the food gap while livelihoods are recovering. Targeted unconditional cash transfers should be used to include older people, PWD and other vulnerable groups.
In the workshop\textsuperscript{20}, agencies discussed some of the main factors that went into their cash transfer programming decisions. In addition to the overall enabling environment highlighted in Section 2, some agencies cited their previous experience in CTP in the Philippines and elsewhere as a main consideration, given that they had existing SOPs, staff capacity and even MOUs with financial service providers (PRC, ACF, OXFAM). Other agencies said they were influenced by the needs assessments and market analyses they conducted as individual agencies. Some indicated that the combination of the enabling environment, their previous in-country experience, plus assessment results made the decision to choose CTP as a response modality a “no brainer”.

Highlighted below are some of the considerations that influenced agencies’ decisions to do CTP in Haiyan as shared by agencies in the workshop. (See also Annex B: Haiyan Cash Transfer Programming and Key Features per Agency)

\textsuperscript{20} UNICEF-UNOCHA CTP Lessons Learnt Workshop, 18-19 Nov. 2014
## Programming Highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leveraging Past experience</th>
<th>Philippine Red Cross (PRC); Plan; Oxfam</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leveraged their pre-Yolanda CTP experience in implementing unconditional cash within several weeks after the disaster, before transitioning to cash interventions designed to restart income generation, livelihood and shelter restoration activities.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Linking relief aid to social protection</th>
<th>WFP, UNICEF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tapped the existing conditional cash transfer mechanism of the government designed for its long-term social protection programme, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Distributed unconditional cash to beneficiaries of Pantawid, who were on the path of Yolanda, to mitigate the immediate impact of the disaster on a population already identified as vulnerable.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Financial Inclusion</th>
<th>Mercy Corps (MC)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Acknowledged early on that its intervention would be on a smaller scale than other agencies’ and deliberately anchored its unconditional cash transfer programme on financial inclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recognized an opportunity to promote banking for the unbanked and the culture of savings to help particularly chronically vulnerable groups be more resilient in the face of calamities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnering with local actors for sustainability</th>
<th>• CARE: Included “the presence of partners with aligned priorities” as one of the criteria in its geographic targeting strategy; and engaged its development partners in implementing its emergency CTP wherever they have presence in the Haiyan-affected areas.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MercyCorps: Delivered unconditional cash grants electronically through its pre-Haiyan partner BanKO, a mobile-based microfinance institution. BanKO is affiliated with the mobile network, Globe, which gave it the built-in capacity to support the cash intervention with mobile access to financial literacy messages and information on financial products e.g. microcredit, micro-insurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PRC and World Vision: Aligned CTP objectives and implementation processes with their operational framework of mobilizing and partnering with (affected) communities and their respective municipal and Local Government Unit (LGU) representatives for sustainability. This means that many of the major programming steps for CTP, e.g. vulnerability criteria setting and targeting were essentially community-driven.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW): Recognized early on the complex nature of landlord-tenant relationship that could compromise its shelter intervention, which had a cash component. IRW designed an emergency to longer-term programme of providing, natural disaster-resilient shelters to Yolanda survivors in Northern Cebu. To ensure beneficiaries did not get evicted out of the houses they were to build, IRW engaged the local authorities, who agreed to provide a formal authorization letter to the beneficiaries stating that they will not be evicted within the agreed number of years of occupancy (see Bo

Table 3.3: EMERGENCY CASH TRANSFER: PROGRAMMING CONSIDERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.3a</td>
<td>Designing cash-based interventions that acknowledge the multipurpose needs of people in crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the constraints necessitated by institutional mandates and a response toolbox with a bias to deliver in-kind assistance, humanitarian actors designed and implemented programmes with a cash component throughout the humanitarian response. CTP was used as a relief tool to meet basic needs; during early recovery to support livelihoods, assets recovery, and debt repayment; and to restore more durable housing on sites endorsed in writing by landowners and local authorities.

As shared in the workshop, agencies, particularly those with long-term development programmes in the Philippines, transitioned their CTPs appropriately from unconditional cash grants to conditional programmes that matched the fast-changing needs of affected communities. Although the CTPs were aligned with agency mandates, post-distribution monitoring results indicate that their interventions also addressed needs beyond their agencies’ sectoral objectives.

GP-3.3b Adapting global development strategies (e.g. financial inclusion—banking the unbanked) to the context and leveraging pre-crisis partnerships with local actors for sustainability.
Global studies envisage linking humanitarian action with social protection as an avenue to scale up future humanitarian cash-based interventions. The circumstance and context surrounding the Haiyan response created an opportunity for this global imperative to be put into action. WFP and UNICEF banked on pre-existing agreements with DSWD to piggyback on the comprehensive cash transfer infrastructure of the government designed for social protection. Although not without challenges, these emergency partnerships forged for the first time in Haiyan, have set in motion a series of actions that lead to a new government-led emergency CTP response that could be designed to achieve both humanitarian and development goals.

Mercy Corps, designed an emergency CTP that: (i) incorporated the principles of financial inclusion, a global poverty reduction strategy centered around “banking the unbanked”; and (ii) also leveraged its existing partnership with a microfinance institution (MFI), BaNKO22, to enhance its capacity to implement its CTP.

Save the Children, recognizing that some survivors borrowed money to quickly fix their houses, incorporated debt relief into the design of a combination of cash and shelter NFIs intervention. The cash component was intended for repayment of high-interest bearing loans.

As part of its response, ILO offered skills development, facilitating “cash-for-training” interventions for disaster survivors who engaged in livelihoods training matched with the labour demand created by Yolanda. ILO leveraged its long-term partnership with TESDA, the technical training arm of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to advocate for labour market assessments along the Yolanda corridor, and development of training modules matched with the labour needs of the private sector in the affected areas. This has potential long-term term benefits particularly for coconut farmers, whose industry would take at least five to six years to recover.

While the actual impact of these interventions on the resilience of the survivors is yet to be determined, these are considered good practices as they provide local actors—in these cases, government, an MFI, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and affected Filipinos—a working framework for bridging survivors of a major catastrophe something to build on from the knowledge and experience acquired during the Yolanda response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L 3.3a</td>
<td>Development ideals, when injected prematurely in a response, could compromise quality of assistance and cause tension in affected communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 MercyCorps was instrumental in the development of BaNKO in 2009. BaNKO is the Philippine’s first mobile phone-based, microfinance-focused savings bank established in partnership between a leading bank and telecommunications company.
Workshop participants discussed the issue around ILO’s advocacy to enroll typhoon victims in the Social Security System (SSS), as part of CFW interventions. Agencies planning cash-based interventions at the onset of the response appreciated the importance of promoting protection of CFW participants and acknowledged their support for health coverage and protective gear particularly for those engaged in massive debris clearing. However, some agencies felt that enrolment of disaster survivors in the social security system for a 15-day CFW activity was beyond the scope of their emergency CTP. One agency said the guidance issued on SSS enrolment was part of its programming consideration to opt out of CFW. Other agencies reported delays in their CFW implementation on the ground and attributed it to the confusion over the SSS guidance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>When?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R 3.3</td>
<td><strong>Form a sub-working group or Task Force that brings together key humanitarian and development actors to look into operationally linking emergency CTP with resilience building. Two Indicative Outputs are suggested below.</strong></td>
<td>HCT, CWG, DSWD, DOLE/TESDA, ILO, UNDP</td>
<td>Within preparedness timeframe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While not without challenges, the concept of combining humanitarian and development initiatives for resilience building is sound and CTP is a rational vehicle for it. This calls for collaborative work. Experience in Yolanda makes it clear that initiatives of this nature must be a product of inclusive discussions and collaborative effort by humanitarian and development actors and bringing these ideals together in a manner and timing most appropriate and meaningful for disaster survivors must be the common goal.

This takes time. Build on the interactions forged in Haiyan amongst agencies under the Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster that planned and implemented skills building, technical training and other initiatives for income generation, asset and livelihoods recovery.

ILO, UNDP, DOLE, TESDA, the Department of Agriculture (DA), DSWD, and other relevant local actors, such as Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), cooperatives, local NGOs could be invited to participate/contribute to the work of the Task Force.

Consider interactions with community self-help group leaders, who would know the credit and loans seeking behavior of vulnerable households as this has an impact on any cash-based livelihoods intervention. Also, seek feedback from Filipinos who engaged in CFW activities during Yolanda.

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24 As reported by Solidarités International to the OCHA Cash Coordinator during the response; and by People in Need during the UNICEF-OCHA Lessons Learnt Workshop in Tacloban, 18-19 November 2014.
The Haiyan Experience

**DSWD and partner humanitarian agencies**

DSWD had existing bilateral partnerships with WFP and UNICEF prior to Haiyan. However, these two UN agencies’ emergency top-up of Pantawid members in the Yolanda areas using DSWD’s CCT platform was ad hoc—borne out of the imperative to scale up and speed up humanitarian response. This new framework has created SOPs and rules of engagement from national down to the LGU level, institutionalizing a system not only to respond to emergencies through conditional cash transfer, but also to bridge assisted communities over to long-term recovery. Over time, this model could be built upon to design timely CTPs that combine emergency short-term support, medium-to-long-term capacity-building and training programmes, and productive initiatives or job placement programmes as a means of linking the immediate horizon with a broader, more sustainable, and resilient outlook.

**Humanitarian agencies**

For agencies with both humanitarian and development programming, the link between relief and resilience cannot be operationalized without first strengthening the linkages between internal departments relevant to cash transfer programming. Some agencies in-country, for example the Philippine Red Cross, have integrated cash into their systems before Haiyan and strengthened operational protocols between departments with an SOP. This enabled PRC to launch one of the earliest distributions of unconditional/multipurpose cash grants post Yolanda, at an unprecedented speed and scale.\(^{25}\) Moreover, PRC was able to transition more seamlessly its target cash recipients from the emergency phase to longer-term shelter and livelihoods programmes.

Agencies could design a series of interventions fit for the needs and capacities in every phase, which could feature hybrid combinations of cash, in-kind, training/skills-building. This would help articulate better at which points cross-cutting themes must be integrated, and when awareness raising on key messages of financial inclusion, savings, building back safer, emergency preparedness, and others could be incorporated.

**Donors**

Donors, particularly DFID and ECHO, have begun funding humanitarian agencies’ preparedness activities. Other donors (both humanitarian and development) should follow suit. Particularly in countries prone to natural disasters, such as the Philippines, institutionalization, capacity building efforts around cash programming within individual humanitarian agencies, including the government, must be supported during preparedness. Without such support, it would be unreasonable to expect harmonized, inter-/multi-agency approaches when internal systems are not in order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative Output 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A widely endorsed government guidance on emergency employment through CFW, with agreed mandatory and optional terms, and a cash transfer value calculation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^{25}\) Case Study: Unconditional cash transfers response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), IFRC-PRC, 2014.
Emergency employment through CFW has been a staple emergency response modality of the Philippine government through its key line agencies: DSWD and DOLE. Prior to Haiyan, the government paid beneficiaries seventy five percent (75%) of the prevailing daily wage rate set by the National Wages and Productivity Commission. The purpose of which was to minimize market distortion, target the most economically disadvantaged individuals, and ensure that the CFW does not entice people away from their regular livelihood activities. Given the devastating impact of Haiyan that would take years for beneficiaries to recover from, the government decided early on to increase the CFW rate by 100 percent.

There is an opportunity at this juncture to develop new standards and policies for emergency CFW, building on the existing DSWD Administrative Order (AO) No. 15 (See Annex C: Key Government Systems, Tools, and Guidance), combined with the learning in Haiyan. DOLE and DSWD must be at the helm of developing this new guidance, with feedback from the operational CTP agencies in the CWG Steering Committee, as well as input from ILO and UNDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative Output 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A referral system between humanitarian and key government agencies that transitions emergency CFW participants to livelihoods and social protection programmes.</strong></td>
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</table>

There is enough experience in Haiyan to draw out a few do-able ways of linking emergency CFW initiatives to more sustainable means of income generation, asset and livelihoods recovery. Both DSWD and DOLE are key stakeholders in producing this output, given their social protection mandates and their strategic roles in implementing emergency CFW.

DSWD has a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) framework that could be used as a guide in attuning activities to emergency CFW beneficiaries. More importantly, DSWD also has the convergence programme that links (or in effect, graduates) Pantawid beneficiaries and potentially poor non-Pantawid households made vulnerable by a crisis to other long-term, poverty-alleviation programmes, e.g. Kalahi-CIDSS and the Sustainable Livelihoods Programme.

DOLE administers DILEEP, which was implemented in the aftermath of both Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit with support from ILO. DILEEP beneficiaries received the regional minimum wage for their CFW, plus government-paid health insurance through the national PhilHealth programme, accident insurance through the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), orientation on occupational safety and health (OSH), and access to Training for Work Scholarships.

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26 Per DSWD’s Administrative Order (AO) no. 15, GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASH-FOR-WORK PROJECT: The daily rate of Cash-For-Work (CFW) shall generally be (see AO no. 15 in Annex B).
27 Kalahi-CIDSS is implemented by DSWD in partnership with Local Government Units (LGUs). It is designed to empower citizens by honing their capacities to analyze their local situation, identify community needs, and implement small-scale community projects in partnership with their LGUs.
28 DSWD’s Sustainable Livelihoods is a programme that caters to Pantawid members, and other (non-Pantawid) poor households identified by the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR), who wish to engage in resource-based and market-driven community micro-enterprises, or explore employment opportunities. Each participant is given the opportunity to choose between the micro-enterprise development track, or the employment facilitation track.
29 DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Programme, which implements CFW to restore livelihoods and provide immediate social protection to vulnerable, unemployed, underemployed, and displaced workers, and survivors of calamities [www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceld=51497]
There remains work to be done by both DSWD and DOLE in coordinating their emergency CFW programmes to minimize the overlap in targeting beneficiaries and to standardize transfer values and benefits.

There needs to be discussions between DSWD, DOLE, humanitarian agencies and development partners as to the different phases within an emergency response when CFW interventions are appropriate and how such interventions could progress in design towards early recovery and livelihoods and onwards to longer-term resilience building. There should be an agreement as to which phase would it be most appropriate for humanitarian agencies to refer their CFW caseload to government social protection programmes.

**Case Study 1. Cash as a response tool could address the multiple needs of affected communities — UNICEF**

UNICEF’s cross sector convergence efforts linked the Emergency Unconditional Cash Transfer Programme beneficiaries to its other sectors initiatives – Health and Nutrition, WASH and Child Protection. The aim was twofold: to ensure a more efficient use of cash and in the process address existing exclusion facilitators that often resulted into deprivation. This was achieved by providing information to enhance access to existing services and where feasible provide direct linkages to service provision.

Households that received information were noted to have changed habits in expenditure; making the choice in support of much needed investments and/or a more efficient option. For example, at least 16% of the household rehabilitation budget was used to construct/ improve water and sanitation facilities. Some households (15%), after receiving messages around nutrition, altered their food consumption habits, purchasing healthy food instead of spending cash on more costly supplements, recording a 30% increase in HDDS from 6.1 at baseline to 9.9 at the end of the programme.

Child protection services were enhanced in five Local Governance Units in Eastern Samar. This was achieved by boosting capacity (equipping offices, hiring additional staff and provision of technical support as appropriate) of the Municipal Social Welfare Development office to address the increase in protection related incidences as a result of Yolanda. Beneficiaries were informed of what incidences constitute abuse of children particularly post emergency. They were taken through the definition and processes of a referral mechanism to enable them to report and/or seek support in addressing some of the issues they may have identified.

One related finding, showed that a good number of beneficiaries were unable to access services as they lacked civil registration documents. This also meant that some of these were excluded regular local government planning processes. In response, UNICEF’s child protection unit supported a civil registration process for 80,000 individuals—8,000 of whom were direct beneficiaries of the cash transfer programme.

Source: UNICEF
3.4 TARGETING / BENEFICIARY SELECTION

Overall, agencies aligned their geographic targeting with the government’s priority areas: the 171 municipalities lying within the 50 km radius of Haiyan’s path assessed to be the worst affected (first priority); and the 644 municipalities right outside the 50 km radius (second priority).

It was clear from the start that identifying recipients of humanitarian assistance in general was going to be a great challenge given the sudden-onset nature of the super typhoon, the massive damage it caused, and its widespread effect on millions of Filipinos living across varying topography in the dispersed islands of the Visayas.

This section highlights the different methods used, main challenges, the key targeting tools available, and presents targeting related experiences as shared by humanitarian agencies in the Nov. 2014 workshop that showed the links between targeting, engaging the affected communities, and integrating cross-cutting themes into emergency cash transfer programmes.

3.4.1 Main Challenges

• The typhoon’s fragmented effect on stricken areas varied across the Visayas, as it hit more densely populated areas in Region VIII in the east, while devastating topographically disparate and remote communities far in between across central and western Regions, IV-b, VI, and VII);
• Many survivors lost identification cards and other important civil registration documents;
• Government facilities, including LGUs suffered from physical damage/loss and needed assistance themselves to recover and regain functionality;
• Absence of baseline data; and
• National population and poverty statistics were outdated.

“We were all affected. Whether we were rich or poor before, we ALL lost everything after Yolanda.”

—Survivor, Tacloban
3.4.2 Key Government Targeting Tools

(a) NHTS-PR. The National Household Targeting for Poverty Reduction, locally known as Listahanan, is the central targeting system of DSWD for all its social protection programmes (including the Pantawid) across the country. It is an information management system that identifies who and where the poor are. Managed by DSWD’s National Household Targeting Office (NHTO), the system makes available to government agencies (e.g. the Social Security System or SSS) and other social protection stakeholders a database of poor households as reference in identifying potential beneficiaries of such programmes. (For more on the methodology of NHTS-PR and how it compares with the data collected through the Community-based Monitoring System, see Annex B.)

NHTO was due to initiate the second round of data collection and validation in 2012, but due to budgetary constraints, the process was delayed. In hindsight, had the second round been done as scheduled, there would have been a 2012 data of the poorest households (both Pantawid and non-Pantawid) when Yolanda hit in Nov. 2013.

During the response, DSWD promptly facilitated a revalidation process focused on locating Pantawid (4Ps) members along the Yolanda path, perceived to be amongst the most vulnerable groups. By January 2014, DSWD, in consultation with affected LGUs, was able to revalidate information on the Pantawid victims of Haiyan and this data became a ready target group for assistance.

For humanitarian actors considering cash transfer, this data, was especially crucial. Pantawid beneficiaries are typically the chronically poor households with children from 0-14 years that the government has targeted for its social protection programme to receive cash transfer monthly or every two months for up to five years.\(^30\) The conditions that a family should meet to receive cash include enrolment of children in schools and access to basic nutrition and healthcare services. Having access to this government data, as well as the whole implementation infrastructure of Pantawid, allowed WFP, and later on UNICEF, to scale-up humanitarian assistance using cash transfer in a relatively easier and shorter period of time (For more on Pantawid, see Annex C).

During the response, the NHTO, after completion of the process of revalidating Pantawid members in Yolanda areas, offered a data triangulation service to humanitarian actors, who had generated their own list of beneficiaries at the local government unit (LGU) level. NHTO estimated it could validate as many as 14,000 names within 24 hours, and encouraged agencies to test out the system. For NHTO, it was an opportunity to improve their data management processes in real-time, during an emergency response. Moreover, if agencies submitted their beneficiary list for triangulation, it would have also enhanced the accuracy of the central database, as well as provided the NHTO a chance to expand its data, with the possibility that agencies would likely be submitting new names of vulnerable Filipinos that the NHTO did not capture in its revalidation process. Although there were a few inquiries from humanitarians coursed through the OCHA Cash Coordinator, no agency actually availed of the NHTS data triangulation service.

(b) Community-based Monitoring System (CBMS). As the name suggests, CBMS is an LGU level data collection process aligned with the decentralized nature of governance in the Philippines. CBMS capacitates LGUs to collect, analyze and use data in evidence-based policymaking and programming. CBMS is known to capture existing data gaps through a comprehensive diagnosis of the extent of poverty at the local level: determining the causes of poverty,

\(^{30}\) Per DSWD, a household with three qualified children can have a subsidy of P1, 400 per month or P15, 000 annually as long as they comply with the conditions.
formulating appropriate policies and programmes, identifying eligible beneficiaries and assessing impact of policies and programmes.

The challenge in Haiyan was that although affected LGUs were highly familiar with the CBMS, having used it at some point, not all of them initiated CBMS data collection process on a regular basis due to a number of variables (e.g., capacity, budget). Still LGUs who had more recent data, were able to feed them into the beneficiary selection processes of those humanitarian agencies, which approached them for assistance. (see Annex C: CBMS FAQs).

(c) **Disaster Assistance Family Access Card (DAFAC).** DAFAC is an integral part of DSWD’s disaster response protocol. It is a registration card/system for victims of disaster primarily initiated at the evacuation centers. DAFAC closely monitors distribution of family food packs, bottled water, and other relief items to ensure that beneficiaries/families receive appropriate assistance.

The DAFAC is a good source of household-level information that contains sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) and a log of food and non-food items received by registered households in evacuation centers (see DAFAC image in Annex B). However, because it is paper-based and manually filled out by social workers and municipal staff, it became a challenge to share DAFAC data with humanitarian agencies. Although DAFAC collects information primarily on in-kind assistance provided by DSWD to households in evacuation centers, it would have been a valuable information source for agencies planning to implement CTP and other forms of assistance. In Tacloban, during the transition between relief and early recovery phase, IOM volunteered to help encode piles and piles of DAFAC “green cards” held in DSWD’s field office region VIII in Tacloban.

"The DAFAC is one way to monitor if a family is under-served or over-served. It confirms that a family is a victim of disaster and is eligible to receive relief assistance."

– Corazon Juliano-Soliman
DSWD Secretary
Targeting Highlights

In the November 2014 -UNICEF-OCHA workshop, targeting strategies and challenges were discussed where participants tried to answer the question: *Were the targeting strategies in Haiyan appropriate at every stage of the emergency response? What were the enabling and limiting factors?*

### Immediate Aftermath

#### First few weeks post Yolanda

**Targeting Amidst Tragedy: Is it Appropriate?**

- It is not possible to verify the total number of humanitarian actors, who provided blanket unconditional cash assistance in the immediate aftermath. However, the early cash injection by a number of humanitarian actors, who distributed unconditional cash grants and implemented massive cash-for-work for debris clearing within the first month were deemed “life-saving” by disaster survivors.31

- LGU officials and community leaders observed how these early cash infusion had an uplifting effect on Haiyan survivors not only in the material sense of being empowered to meet their immediate household needs, but also in psychosocial terms—being assured amidst such a devastating tragedy that they would not be abandoned; that they would receive cash whether they had valid identification or not.

- The early blanket cash distribution based mainly on identified worst-hit areas also became a catalyst for market creation/restoration, signaling to traders and entrepreneurs in neighboring towns that survivors would need easy access to basic goods and services.

**TzuTchi; Oxfam, UNDP | DSWD, DOLE (with support from ILO)**

- TzuTchi Foundation’s rapid, no regrets blanket approach—perceived to be the earliest cash intervention in Haiyan—garnered resounding praises from affected Filipinos despite being initially criticized by humanitarian agencies (see Box 2).

- Oxfam distributed unconditional cash grants hand-to-hand within the first month following rapid needs and market analysis.

- Both TzuChi and Oxfam, along with UNDP and national govt. agencies DSWD and DOLE (with support from ILO), implemented massive emergency employment through Cash-for-Work across the Haiyan affected areas. These agencies mainly used the self-targeting approach based on disaster survivors’ ability to engage in intensive debris clearing in the first month.

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31 From FGDs and information shared through agencies’ complaints and feedback mechanism.
A Case for Excluding the Vulnerable?

- During this critical, life-threatening period, agencies were driven by the humanitarian principle of prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable Filipinos as quickly as possible without doing harm.

- Geographic targeting and the Local Government Units were primarily the entry points to identify vulnerable communities. At the LGU level, agencies deployed varying targeting methodologies.

- Larger agencies maximized their capacity to scale up using existing systems, partnerships and pre-Yolanda presence in the affected regions. Smaller ones prioritized the harder-to-reach areas that they could serve within their limited capacity.

- OCHA and DSWD advocated for targeting both vulnerable Pantawid beneficiaries (4Ps) within the affected regions, but also the poor, who are non-Pantawid beneficiaries. General guidance on cash transfer programming as a form of assistance was prepared by DSWD’s National Advisory Council (NAC) in collaboration with OCHA, and widely circulated early January 2014 (see Annex C).

- Overall, evaluations indicate that the humanitarian community collectively reached and protected the most vulnerable of the disaster-affected population during this period.

- However, there was anecdotal evidence that the advocacy to target the vulnerable Pantawid beneficiaries led to tension in some communities. One barangay was reported to have told their LGU that agencies targeting only Pantawid beneficiaries may re-direct their assistance to another barangay. This community decided as a whole that it will accept only blanket support, where cash assistance is shared equally by every household. This is consistent to the “All-for-one; one-for-all” spirit of the bayanihan, a cultural tradition still strongly practiced in many rural areas.

- IFRC-PRC applied the geographic targeting approach incorporating variables from PRC’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): (i) proportionality of affected population to total population; (ii) poverty ranking of the province; (iii) class of municipality; and (iv) proportion of fully and partially damaged housing stock. Once the specific barangays that would receive assistance were identified, it was then decided that all households within these selected barangays would receive cash assistance. For the German Red Cross and Swiss Red Cross bilateral programmes, the selection criteria were based on shelter and household vulnerability.

- By piggy-backing on the government’s conditional cash transfer programme for social protection, WFP was able to scale up its assistance early on eliminating the targeting process that shortened its response time. Beneficiaries of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme belonged to the vulnerable group, which was pre-selected through a more scientific approach – the Proxy Means Test prior to Yolanda by DSWD’s National Household Targeting System (See Annex C for more on the NHTS-PR). WFP, in ensuring inclusion, conducted a two-stage process, firstly, they worked with the NHTS DSWD list, and this enabled them to identify the

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32 Barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines

33 Bayanihan is a Filipino word derived from the word bayan meaning town, nation, or community in general.

"Bayanihan" literally means, “being a bayan,” and is thus used to refer to a spirit of communal unity and cooperation.

34 (IFRC-PRC) Case study: Unconditional cash transfers response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)
beneficiaries within the programme needing assistance. WFP also worked with the LGUs to target affected populations that were not identified through the NHTS programme. The list was validated by the community leaders to limit errors of inclusion, exclusion.

• Similarly, UNICEF used the government’s conditional cash transfer programme for social protection, as a platform to targeting the beneficiaries of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme in the most affected areas and partnered with ACF to identify vulnerable groups outside of the Social protection programme needing assistance. ACF applied a more perceptive approach to targeting using the Community based Targeting system. In some areas, being a member to Pantawid (4Ps) was an exclusion marker, with the assumption that Pantawid beneficiaries have already been targeted by other agencies. At the end of the programme, UNICEF shared the ACF beneficiary list with DSWD for review with the goal of inclusion in the NHTS database.

• Mercy Corps (MC) not having the capacity to mount a large-scale response, anchored its CTP on the strategic objective of financial inclusion. It also deliberately targeted underserved communities in Northern Cebu and included membership to Pantawid (4Ps) as an exclusion marker, aware that Pantawid beneficiaries have already been targeted by other agencies. For Mercy Corps their means of limiting duplication error was at the site selection process. They coordinated with other agencies, partners on the ground, as well as community leaders to figure out who was already doing what to avoid duplication

• In order to minimize duplication errors during beneficiary selection, World Vision signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with LGUs, leveraging local knowledge and existing relationship with local officials. This arrangement led to the ease of acceptance of the cash for work program, and a timely resolution of issues facilitated by barangay officials. In addition, WV used the Last Mile Mobile Solution (LMMS) technology to collect beneficiary information and store it in the LMMS database, enabling it to use the list to determine and meet beneficiaries unmet needs.

35 Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) is mobile technology developed by World Vision Canada that is designed to make the delivery of humanitarian aid quicker and easier. LMMS uses a hand-held device that works even in remote areas to register people affected by crises. With the hand-held device, aid workers can gather basic information about each person and issue registration cards, which are then used to improve the speed and efficiency of aid distributions. The data gathered can also be analyzed quickly and used to plan additional assistance, and to monitor and report on the assistance provided. http://www.lastmilemobilesolutions.com
Is Vulnerability always Visible?

- Engaging affected communities in the targeting process ensured that otherwise hidden vulnerabilities were identified and fed into the design of cash transfer programmes that addressed gender inequalities, promoted accountability and disaster resilience.
- By the end of February, as agencies began planning/designing their CTPs for the early recovery phase, beneficiary selection became more aligned with restoration, as well as with institutional mandates and funding availability. Agencies with CTP experience in past emergencies used their own vulnerability criteria and a more perceptive approach—community based targeting; and in the case of cash for work, self targeting based on an ability to engage in work. Other approaches used include the score card method in ensuring that the most vulnerable of the vulnerable were reached and in some ways reducing potential errors of exclusion.
- Geographic targeting and the Local Government Units (LGUs) were primarily the entry points to identifying vulnerable communities. Most agencies engaged closely with LGUs in order to verify, validate the beneficiary list. Moreover, by tapping the deep knowledge of local officials of their constituencies, there were a number of creative, participatory targeting methods that emerged in this phase of the response:

UNICEF through ACF, Plan, TdH, Oxfam, Save the Children, CRS

- ACF’s use of the feedback and accountability mechanism enabled the review and revalidation of the beneficiary list. This led to a less than one (1%) percent error of inclusion and continued adjustments of the lists during programme implementation. The beneficiary list was thus deemed to be a living document allowing for corrective measures during implementation.
- ACF maintained a very detailed feedback mechanism enabling a more transparent and a participatory approach to targeting.
- Plan, through its complaints and feedback mechanism, noted that delays in payments affected their self-targeting processes in the CFW programme. Initially the feedback mechanism was through a suggestion box which was not easy to reach on a regular basis due to vast distances between the beneficiaries and the box’s location and the office location. The formation of a grievance committee at the community level assisted significantly in addressing the complaints raised providing an avenue for more constructive feedback. This is an effective approach as it sets up a relationship of trust with the community having a constantly operational complaints and feedback platform throughout the barangay being served. Communities had the option of reporting directly to the agency in cases where they were not comfortable sharing their concerns with the barangay or other members of the community.
- Oxfam targeted specific vulnerable groups: women, out-of-school youth and members of the LGBT community, to participate in a cash-for-training initiative with the objective to enhance their capacity and enable them engage in reconstruction activities across Eastern Visayas. Oxfam partnered with GREEN Mindanao, a local NGO in Leyte, and with TESDA in Northern Cebu, to train these groups in carpentry and masonry in communities where there was great demand for such skills, for example in fishing villages where fisherfolk comprise the majority of the labour force.
- Terre des homes, also TdH had a two-phase targeting methodology. In the first phase, it relied on the beneficiary list provided by municipalities. For
the second phase, however, it formed targeting committees incorporating a more inclusive participatory approach. The gender-balanced committee of 8-10 members had multi-sectorial backgrounds (e.g. teachers, religious leaders, women’s group representative, health worker, etc.) The committee generated a pre-selected beneficiaries list and validated it afterwards through a house-to-house assessment. This process ensured a high level of accuracy in beneficiary selection, but was nevertheless time consuming. Despite the constraints, the process allowed for a real bottom-up approach and thus strengthened the trust and relationship between TdH and the communities served.

- **Save the Children** conducted a participatory community hazard and capacity mapping exercise as well as a cross-sector detailed house-to-house assessment. Through this exercise, the community members assessed reported that many of them were initially disqualified as they were viewed to be better off. Having since made quick fixes to their damaged houses and or repaired their tricycles or pedicabs by the time the initial assessment was done, their efforts to move on were assumed to depict household resilience and ability to recover. What was invisible was their vulnerability—the reality was that they were in debt, some from sari-sari stores, relatives, and some from loan sharks exerting punitive interest rates. Not receiving assistance in the emergency phase and being debt-ridden before they could even be on the path to long-term recovery made this group highly vulnerable. Save the Children’s integrated shelter and livelihoods cash-based intervention factored in a portion of the cash grant to help reduce the debt burden on existing housing loan (the focus was on the repayment of the principal amount, excluding any interest). The integrated approach also included awareness raising and capacity building in savings and financial literacy.

- During the recovery phase, CRS targeted the same households as it did during the emergency phase. This included coconut farmers and fisherfolk in rural areas, and the urban poor in cities. In this regard, CRS designed a conditional cash transfer programme for the livelihoods recovery of target beneficiaries over the course of five years, taking into account that emergency cash transfer programming could act as a bridge for Typhoon Yolanda survivors from relief to long-term recovery.
Table 3.4: TARGETING / BENEFICIARY SELECTION
Good Practices, Lessons, and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practices</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.4a</td>
<td>WFP and UNICEF targeting pre-disaster vulnerable groups through the government’s flagship social protection programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WFP and UNICEF targeted beneficiaries of DSWD’s Pantawid programme in the Yolanda affected areas and topped up the conditional cash they receive. Such engagement was strategic in that;</td>
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<td>• There was a ready target group, combined with the existing bilateral agreements with DSWD, and capacity of both UN agencies facilitated rapid, scaled up response;</td>
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<td>• It mitigated the immediate impact of the disaster on a population already pre-targeted as vulnerable and in need of a more structured assistance to address chronic vulnerability prior to Yolanda;</td>
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<td>• The engagement sensitized DSWD Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) staff to working closely with humanitarian agencies in implementing a scaled-up, emergency unconditional cash transfer;</td>
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<td>• It increased appreciation amongst national and sub-national DSWD officials and staff of cash transfer as an appropriate form of emergency assistance, particularly during large-scale emergencies (see Section 4: Institutionalization).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Raised awareness within DSWD of the value of its CCT infrastructure and its great potential to be modified into an emergency delivery platform.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• It presented DSWD with convergence opportunities between or amongst social protection programmes across the humanitarian-development continuum, providing that operational link between relief to resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.4b</td>
<td>Agencies linking with Local Government Units (LGUs), and community stakeholders for targeting and programme implementation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Government of the Philippines is highly decentralized. The Local Government Code devolves to all local units the administration of five basic services: health, social welfare, maintenance of public works and highways and environmental protection. The municipal social welfare office has an institutionalized grievance mechanism and get called upon to address any issues or disputes amongst members of the community, including domestic cases. They are also the custodians of National level initiatives within their areas of jurisdictions e.g. the social protection programs. During an emergency, LGUS officials are the first responders.</td>
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<td>In this regard, LGUs are the most strategic information source and conduit to reaching every single member of the community within their jurisdiction. During Haiyan, LGUs played a key role in helping agencies with CTP, particularly in the targeting process, which could be arduous, especially since a majority of typhoon survivors lost their civil registration documents including identification cards. Overall, agencies with existing relationships with LGUs and communities outside of the disaster had less challenges with targeting, given strong assistance from LGUs and communities themselves.</td>
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</table>
CTP agencies, which collected feedback from the community systematically, were able to capture information that would not have otherwise emerged from standard assessment and monitoring procedures. This classified information facilitated more accurate targeting. Moreover, CTP agencies, which created community groups tasked to help establish the vulnerability selection criteria and generate beneficiary lists, reported receiving less complaints, given that the community groups’ output were well vetted amongst the general membership of the barangay.

Community engagement in targeting also led to more creative and accountable CTP design that addressed gender inequalities, and took into consideration some factors that at times make vulnerability invisible, for example, indebtedness, and other potentially harmful coping mechanisms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L-3.4a</td>
<td>Targeting for cash transfer must always be context-specific down to the regional level. In the worst affected region, a more blanket approach was deemed appropriate in the immediate aftermath; whereas a more targeted strategy was applied in another region.</td>
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<td>Communities have been vocal about how those agencies quick to provide them cash within the first several weeks “saved their lives”. Targeting a whole community for a blanket cash intervention in the immediate aftermath could be uplifting for the affected population on different levels as it: (i) alleviates some of the shock from their tragic loss; (ii) trigger communal/ familial network and support systems; and (iii) speed up market recovery especially in areas where marketplaces are severely damaged, given that a whole community with cash would have demands for goods and services and this would be a new market for traders in nearby towns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-3.4b</td>
<td>Community-based targeting requires extensive consultations that could cause delays; however, this remains to be the most effective route towards ensuring humanitarian action is accountable to the affected population.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community-based targeting has lengthy validation procedures. In some cases, it was reported that from the time the community was first engaged, to the first cash distribution, it could take between 30 – 60 days. This process could be shortened, building on the new knowledge and new partnerships amongst local stakeholders borne out of Haiyan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-3.4c</td>
<td>Vulnerability is not always visible.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Across the Yolanda-affected areas, there were survivors, who were in effect “penalized” for being resilient. Because a number of affected Filipinos were quick to fix (whether it’s their shelter or source of income, e.g. a tricycle), by the time assessment teams arrived in their communities to validate the targeting, some were deemed not eligible for assistance, or received less after being evaluated to have a house that was only “partially damaged”. The perception was that they had the means to recover, when the reality was, they borrowed money from the informal credit system, in some case at high interest rates, which is very much part of the culture, particularly in rural areas. Another misperception was related to migration, a significant exclusion determinant.</td>
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</table>
Some members of households left their local areas in search of labor opportunities. Such households were then assessed as having the means to self-recover, without knowing the circumstances around the decision to leave, or whether the household member who left had secured a job or was able to send money back home. For examples, some FGDs and random interviews with Yolanda survivors indicated that some female members of the family left for Manila within the first few months of the response to seek a better source of income for the family. However, there were anecdotal reports of young women trafficked to Manila, where they were promised easy income in the service industry.

For the government, which had limited capacity at the time, the priorities were those in evacuation centers and those who stayed in their barangays visibly needing assistance, without consideration that among them may be households with access to support, e.g. relatives abroad sending regular remittance. These exemplify the complexities in defining vulnerability that would require a more nuanced understanding of the local context.

### L-3.4d

**In a sudden-onset natural disaster, there will always be survivors without identification documents. This needs to be anticipated/mitigated by emergency CTP stakeholders in the future.**

Lack of valid identification documents was a common programmatic obstacle reported by many agencies. What this meant was that selected beneficiaries could potentially be excluded from receiving much needed assistance. There were those who had lost documents during Yolanda, and those who had never undergone any process of civil registration and would therefore not formally exist in any government records. To resolve this, agencies provided Identification cards, in collaboration with the Financial Service Provider (FSP) they partnered with to facilitate the delivery of cash. However, this solution was organization-specific and the issued ID would allow access to cash only from a particular organization. This means that if a beneficiary’s needs are not all met by the ID-issuing agency, then the beneficiary would have to undergo a similar vetting process to access assistance from another agency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>When?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-3.4a</td>
<td>Include LGUs in any preparedness training or learning event, or policy review on cash transfer programming.</td>
<td>GoP/DILG; development actors, humanitarians</td>
<td>Within preparedness timeframe</td>
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<td>LGUs are integral to targeting/beneficiary selection and to reaching the most vulnerable members of the community. They also provide enabling environments that support payment systems, markets, and a feedback platform aligned with key operational aspects of CTP. As first responders, the inclusion of LGUs in learning events and policy reviews would enhance the implementation of emergency CTPs in future emergencies.</td>
<td>Donors, WFP, UNICEF, DSWD</td>
<td>Within preparedness timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-3.4b</td>
<td>Support DSWD’s efforts to develop an emergency version of its national social safety net programme, which has a conditional cash transfer infrastructure. WFP, UNICEF: review pre-existing bilateral</td>
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</table>
agreements with DSWD pre-Haiyan, and agree on a more predictably timed, coordinated intervention through the Pantawid cash transfer infrastructure. Both agencies have the capacity to deliver a rapid, scaled up response, but this needs to be better coordinated, such that targeting is more accurate, overlaps are avoided, and systems are de-conflicted for wider coverage.\textsuperscript{36}

The cyclical nature of disasters against a background of high poverty incidence compelled the Government of the Philippines to implement a no nonsense social protection programme for poor and vulnerable households. At the same time, humanitarian agencies in the Philippines found themselves responding to a succession of emergencies in recent years striking households already mired in chronic poverty. This has led to humanitarian actors coordinating their responses around mitigating the impact of the emergency on disaster-affected Filipinos who are also eligible beneficiaries of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, the government’s flagship social safety net.

In this regard, DSWD must be supported to develop such an emergency CTP system, which would be an agile version of Pantawid’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) infrastructure. The Pantawid CCT has all the key features of an emergency CTP, from targeting through programme implementation. It has a sophisticated set of monitoring and evaluation tools, a very strong feedback mechanism, and built-in targeting, validation, registration of beneficiaries, as well as cash distribution channels.

UNICEF having worked in close collaboration with DSWD has appraised this system looking at policy institutionalization, calibration options and priority preparedness work to be undertaken. Both UNICEF and WFP, which piggybacked on the infrastructure ad hoc in Haiyan, were able to scale up delivery of unconditional/multipurpose cash assistance to thousands of households. In all likelihood, both agencies would course their multipurpose cash assistance through DSWD’s emergency cash transfer platform in future emergencies, particularly large-scale ones that would require a swift, scaled up response. Both agencies and the humanitarian community in the country have a stake in this and must therefore support this government initiative. Such an emergency infrastructure would facilitate a more systematic, accurate way of targeting and reaching the most vulnerable after an emergency, and would also provide a path to early to longer-term recovery, social protection, and resilience to cyclical disasters.

| R-3.4c | Support DSWD in digitizing the Disaster Assistance Family Access Card (DAFAC). | Donors, HAs, humanitarian agencies, | Within preparedness timeframe |

\textsuperscript{36} This could be a preparedness activity initiated by the CWG Steering Committee, of which WFP, UNICEF and OCHA, plus NGOs are members. This could also mitigate the issues raised around ID cards. If such a regulation is already in place before the next disaster, beneficiary registration processes and issuance of ID/ATM cards will be a faster process.
One of DSWD’s emergency response protocols at the LGU level, is the registration of affected households in designated evacuation centers into the Disaster Assistance Family Access Cards, also known as DAFAC or “green card”. This is a paper-based, handwritten card filled out, usually by a social worker, or a DSWD Municipal Link while interviewing families in the evacuation centers. The DAFAC collects sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) and other valuable information about affected families and enumerates the nature of in-kind assistance received from DSWD at evacuation centers. (See Annex C: DAFAC card)

The DAFAC is a tool the government uses for targeting, beneficiary identification and registration. Essentially, the cards contain information of potentially new vulnerable households after an emergency. However, as it is still paper-based, it is cumbersome to fill out and even more tedious to encode into a computer-based data processing system.

During Haiyan, there were piles and piles of DAFAC paper cards stacked up in a DSWD field office. While beneficiary data was collected manually, the effort did not contribute to the efficiency of the response initiatives. If the DAFAC is digitized, it could capture, not only in-kind assistance received, but also cash transfers.

In the Haiyan response, World Vision International used its LMMS technology to provide identification and register targeted beneficiaries to receive cash. Oxfam also subscribed to the system. Given that an integral part of the LMMS technology and procedure is beneficiary registration and issuance of individual ID cards, the LMMS is one avenue DSWD could explore to digitize and expand the DAFAC data collection system. This could mitigate the issue of lack of identification cards, while enhancing government capacity to deliver assistance by improving data collection at evacuation centers.

World Vision is ensuring that there is a focal point for the LMMS technology in the Philippines. Given WV’s ongoing presence in Region VIII, it could initiate a pilot of the LMMS with the LGUs it is already working with in its cash transfer programming for Haiyan and Hagupit affected communities. Moreover, if in the future, the DAFAC process is conducted and documented in a similar approach to the LMMS system, then the electronic nature of the data (as opposed to the current paper-based) could be easily transposed to a central database, e.g. the National Household Targeting System, which could then use the information to track new vulnerable households.

Donors, international humanitarian agencies, or the private sector should support this digitization during preparedness. DSWD must ensure that the system it adopts for this process has inter-operability with existing data systems in-house.

R-3.4d Engage the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and advocate for an emergency regulation relaxing the “Know-your-Customer” (KYC) regulation. | BSP, CWG, FSPs | Within preparedness timeframe
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During Yolanda, financial service providers (FSPs) that humanitarian agencies partnered with to distribute cash approached BSP bilaterally to relax the KYC regulation, which has a set of mandatory documents and information that customers must submit to access certain financial products and services. BSP acquiesced during the response phase and has signaled to CTP actors that it is open to dialogue over financial service-related emergency preparedness initiatives. This has been discussed during the first preparedness meeting of the Cash Working Group in March 2015 and it is recommended that this dialogue and potential collaboration with BSP be prioritized, as
it is feasible to have an output before the next typhoon season. This could also mitigate the issues raised in around ID cards.

3.5 MARKET SYSTEM ENGAGEMENT

Yolanda cut across the middle part of the Philippines, sweeping from Eastern to Western Visayas, devastating a long strip of urban settlements, fishing villages, farmlands, coconut fields, upland areas, and small islands. The landscape and topography of the affected areas were diverse; as was the demographics of the affected communities—their livelihoods, productive assets and sources of income, pre-Haiyan. As such, post-Yolanda, market behavior and dynamics varied significantly from one community to another. So did the cost of labour and services. The speed of recovery of markets in these affected areas varied significantly as well. This hinged on many factors: the physical state of the market and trade routes, stock levels, and re-stock capacities of markets in neighboring municipalities outside of Haiyan’s path, plus the affected area’s proximity and connectivity to regional commercial hubs.

Cash transfer programming required a rapid evaluation of how integrated the market system was, and which financial service providers (FSP) were most accessible to the intended recipients of cash, the FSPs’ delivery and monitoring capacity, and implementation costs. How the vulnerable target population in Haiyan interacted with the markets, with all their complexities, was just one dimension for consideration, from the perspective of humanitarian agencies considering CTP.

The challenges and lessons learnt identified here were mainly experienced in the early relief phase. Good practices emerged during the early recovery livelihoods phase as the market systems were picking up and were engaged in a way that they respond adequately to the livelihoods and shelter needs of the affected communities.

Market Engagement Highlights

- There was evidence of a great number of rapid needs and market assessments conducted by agencies individually in the aftermath of Yolanda.

- There was also a comprehensive, more in-depth ACAPS\(^{37}\) secondary data review that consolidated the key findings of the market assessments, offered some analysis focusing on the effects of Yolanda on key livelihoods and industries, and an overview of the banking and formal and informal financial services within the affected areas. This was released in early January 2014.

- However, feedback from agencies indicated that markets were recovering/-changing rapidly by the day and that monitoring of markets

\(^{37}\) Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) is a non-profit initiative of a consortium of three NGOs (ACF, Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children International) created in December 2009, with the aim of supporting the humanitarian community with needs assessments.
and the dynamics around them needed to happen at the regional level as well as on the ground.

• Similarly, there was initial information collected at the national level on the locations and capacities of Financial Service Providers (FSPs) that did not match the facts at the operational level.

• Market information were monitored individually by agencies and was shared at cluster level but not systematically, and did not necessarily link with any coordinated action, i.e. influence on amounts paid, or mitigation strategies to control prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market system engagements per sector</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Shelter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Food, Shelter, and Livelihoods)</strong></td>
<td>• Before implementing its cash and voucher programme, WFP surveyed traders to check if they had enough supply of basic food items to support its unconditional cash transfer injection.</td>
<td>• Save the Children and IOM had to consider a number of market factors for their cash for shelter intervention: Key questions included but not limited to; If the market supplies support building back to the minimum safety standards? And if the markets for construction materials were accessible to its beneficiaries?</td>
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<td>• Based on WFP’s initial market assessments, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) recommended a food basket cash transfer value of between PHP4,300-4,600. This was estimated to be sufficient to meet the minimum kcal value of 2100 per person per day. However, this was not universally adhered to by FSAC partner agencies.</td>
<td>• Aside from conducting assessments of the construction market, from one barangay to another, Save the Children also approached larger suppliers to conduct a caravan sale of pre-identified shelter materials 1 – 7 days following the cash payout.</td>
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<td>• For its food voucher programme implemented during the early recovery phase, Save the Children conducted a survey of existing traders, averaged the price of basic food commodities, and set a price ceiling for each commodity. Save the Children then signed service agreements with the selected merchants, who agreed to maintain the agreed upon prices during the period of implementation.</td>
<td>• In addition, Save the Children also alerted larger suppliers of the day/week of their cash delivery to beneficiaries and advised them to stock up on the right kind of CGI sheets, so that they could recommend their shops to beneficiaries. Target communities were advised to pool money and make purchases in bulk. This would save on cost of materials and transportation, as well as to mitigate cost fluctuations.</td>
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<td>• IOM did not engage the local markets as much as Save the Children, bringing in a significant bulk of quality shelter materials, which made up 70 percent of its intervention, 30 percent being cash. While IOM felt that construction markets have the capacity to supply quality materials, it had observed that often, they dilute the quality to maximize profit.</td>
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Overall IOM bought materials in bulk, but for its livelihood recovery support, it approached local farmers processing lumber and gave them the required specifications. Along with shelter kits, IOM provided training and unconditional cash. Some used the cash to pay for labour, or buy extra materials to re-enforce what they themselves constructed.

**Livelihoods**

- In Tacloban, there was coordination amongst agencies and DSWD and DOLE to standardize CFW rates at PHP260 per day (the equivalent of the minimum wage rate set by the government for urban areas in Region VIII) across rural and urban sites.
- However, despite efforts to share information and coordinate through working groups, agencies paid different rates for labour in other areas and concerns were raised that higher payments distorted the labour market.
- ILO offered skills development as part of its response, with an understanding of the demand and supply trends in the labour market. Other agencies also carried out micro assessments of the labour market. The question however arises as to the appropriateness of certain skills trainings geared towards livelihoods support, but provided in the context of an emergency when the priority for the targeted beneficiaries is survival. ILO took into consideration the different skills set of beneficiaries, providing different CFW rates of between PhP 260 – PhP 600. ILO stressed that beneficiaries, who have been certified by TESDA, could take on the role of a foreman/supervisor and should therefore be compensated at a higher rate: PHP600 daily wage for skilled carpenters; PHP 500 for masons.
- There was no agreed hierarchy of wage rates amongst agencies to compensate beneficiaries with advanced skills. The challenge in the context of a sudden-onset emergency is that it would take time to identify and categorize beneficiaries, who can offer skilled labour, particularly if certifying documents that would prove their skills and competencies were lost/destroyed.
- Shelter cluster partners engaged the markets not just for shelter goods, but also for services, e.g. providing construction skills training in partnership with government agencies: DOLE and TESDA.
- Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) hired a boat expert to do a market survey of boat-related items needed for repair and other implements, such as nets. IRW set the cash grant based on the boat expert’s market findings.
- There were reports that some beneficiaries, who received construction skills training, immediately left for Cebu or Manila where daily wage rates are higher—an unintended outcome but beneficial to the household economy.
Partnerships with Financial Service Providers (FSPs) and private sector

- Overall, this was a successful feature of CTP in Haiyan, albeit not without challenges. The new partnerships between CTP agencies and financial service providers not only facilitated scale-up and ease of transfer, but also minimized risk to both agency staff and beneficiaries.

- Agencies partnering with FSPs for the first time shared challenges around contractual terms that highlighted the distinct differences between the humanitarian and corporate languages and timeframes. This resulted in significant delays of up to two months, in some instance.

- In contrast, agencies, which had existing MOAs with FSPs based on relationships established during previous emergencies, such as PRC and Oxfam, experienced shorter delays.

- FSPs became active members of the Manila-based Cash Working Group, attending meetings, sharing lessons and areas for improvement from their perspective, good practices, and innovations.

- The group of FSPs, which partnered with humanitarian agencies during Yolanda, consisted of telephone companies, the Philippine postal system, pawnshops, a door-to-door courier company—all with varying coverage and capacities to deliver across the country. These FSPs have long served the public with various electronic payment services, which have thrived on the country’s billion-dollar remittance economy.

- This concrete partnership with private companies has sparked a healthy appreciation amongst the FSPs that responding to emergencies does not have to be limited only to corporate responsibility, but could even be part of their core business, given the fact that the Philippines is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practices</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.5a</td>
<td>In-country humanitarian agencies having pre-arranged MOAs with different Financial Service Providers (FSPs).</td>
<td>Joint market assessments are ideal, but such arrangements must be pre-agreed and tested during preparedness, not while responding to a sudden onset disaster the scale of Haiyan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For some agencies, e.g. PRC and Oxfam, having existing agreements with a few different FSPs meant that when Yolanda struck, the whole process of entering into a new agreement with an FSP was eliminated. The pre-existing MOAs were established during previous emergencies.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GP-3.5b</td>
<td>Designing a context-specific cash transfer programme for repayment of high-interest bearing shelter loan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Following a house-to-house assessment prior to the design of its recovery intervention, Save the Children discovered that a significant number of potential beneficiaries owed sizeable loans, bearing interest as high as 20 percent, if not more (see below: L-3.5c). They therefore designed their programme to ease this debt pressure focused on shelter reconstruction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.5c</td>
<td>Designing cash programmes that directly support local market actors capable of easing the cash and voucher transfer process for the beneficiaries, while speeding up the response.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In areas where there were fewer or no FSPs, agencies such as ACF, SCUK worked with traders making available much needed support through commodity and cash vouchers. ACF engaged traders from whom selected beneficiaries could redeem their vouchers. The traders had the opportunity to redeem their payment on a daily basis through a financial service provider appointed by ACF: Palawan Pera Padala Remittance Center. This partnership combination—local trader plus FSP— allowed ACF to respond quickly, given that it did not have the capacity to reach all areas of the municipality. Such partnership combination enabled ACF to reach a vast group of people within a short time. This is also when cash programming has multiplier effects, benefiting not just the affected recipients whose purchasing power creates demand for certain commodities, but also the traders and suppliers supported to meet such demand. When ACF alerted suppliers of the planned cash distribution dates and potential volume of demand, the traders were able to stock up adequate supplies. Save the Children also advised the traders to stock up on the right kind of CGI sheets, so that they could recommend their shops to beneficiaries. Target communities were advised to pool money and make purchases in bulk. This saved on the cost of materials and transportation.</td>
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</table>
One lesson from the Haiyan experience is that forming joint market assessment teams required time-consuming coordination among agencies particularly on resources (e.g. logistics, staff), coverage, which agency is paying for which cost? In the immediate aftermath of Yolanda, there were initial discussions in the Cash Working Group on conducting a joint market assessment. The intention is valid, but the timing of such a huge undertaking was inappropriate.

Even with the presence of a good number of CTP expertise in the early days of the response, it was unrealistic to expect that joint market assessments should have happened without pre-planning and pre-agreement on roles and responsibilities. Such expectation did not also take into consideration the nature of the Philippines as an archipelago, and the disparate nature of Haiyan’s impact on very distinct market systems. This meant that affected communities in the three regions worst hit by Haiyan experienced varying speeds of market recovery and as such any joint market assessment arrangements during the response would have to be agreed upon at the regional/hub level, where actors are face-to-face with the realities on the ground.

**L-3.5b** In-kind distributions, some lasting for six months, may have slowed down recovery of local economy

Some forms of assistance were reportedly more resource-driven than needs-based. While there is no evidence of this taking place at a large scale, some feedback from beneficiaries around the fifth- to sixth- month mark of the Yolanda response indicated that households have received numerous cycles of NFIs from various agencies. The result was that in some instances, beneficiaries were reportedly selling a second set of similar NFIs they already received, in effect competing with the local merchants and sari-sari store owners selling similar NFIs. Even if such NFIs were not sold in exchange for cash, a lower demand for products, which the beneficiaries received as assistance in-kind, would still have adverse effects on the recovery of store owners, shopkeepers and the local economy in general. One beneficiary said in a focused group discussion: “We received a lot of in-kind items from different agencies… we got everything we would need to fill up an entire house… the only thing missing is the house.”

**L-3.5c** A deeper understanding, analysis of cultural traditions and practices, and how they interact with market dynamics could help design more context-specific cash programmes and reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion

The customs and cultural practices of Filipinos in disaster prone areas with many pockets of communities in chronic poverty, and their relationship with markets and marketplaces are intangible factors that warrant consideration when designing CTPs. With the country absorbing varying degrees of damages from an average of 20 typhoons per year, these vulnerable communities, in many cases, have well developed coping mechanisms that tap customs and practices, such as the trust-based informal credit system with sari-sari store owners; the “5/6” credit with loan sharks; the groupsavings scheme called, *paluwagan*, with neighbors and/or relatives. Understanding these cultural norms will help identify better who is vulnerable, those with negative coping strategies, and minimize inclusion and exclusion errors. Knowing these customs and practices could enhance CTP design (see GP-3.5b).

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38 FGD in a small island: Barangay Talotu-an, off the coastal town of Concepcion, Iloilo, with WFP, WV, DFID and OCHA, April 2014.
39 Translated loosely into English as the “merry-go-round”.

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Humanitarian agencies and financial service providers (FSPs) work under very different frameworks and it would take some time—not during a large-scale response—for both parties to understand how each other works.

This relatively new relationship forged in Yolanda encountered teething problems. Both parties mutually recognized that the two main challenges were: (i) they spoke different languages; and (ii) the tedious contractual back and forth between the legal departments of both sides. In some cases, this delayed the start up of cash distribution for up to three months.

Humanitarian actors, in particular UN agencies, are accustomed to being chased after by service providers. As large actors with significant donor funding, they saw themselves as a “big catch” for any FSP. As such, one assumption was that FSPs would pander to every request made by the new UN client.

As private sector actors, FSPs, on the other hand, are not used to working under duress, and are more used to working on clear client specifications. Moreover, while different in nature (remittance agencies, mobile network operators, postal and courier companies, pawnshops), FSPs have a few things in common, each one: is a stable, long-running, profitable business in the country; has a well-established market base; offers remittance products and services catering to Filipinos overseas. These FSPs have a long standing relationship with their customers developed over time.

One issue raised during the emergency phase was that some UN agencies were asking for business proposals and costing under tight deadlines without providing key information, e.g. the number of target recipients of the cash transfer. This was one among several points of discussions and clarification between FSPs and humanitarian agencies. Another source of delay was the actual contractual process. In one Cash Working Group Meeting FSPs inquired about the feasibility of a common contract template amongst UN agencies and other humanitarian agencies. FSPs said there is a significant portion of UN contracts that required the same information from FSPs, which they had to plug into different UN forms for every partnership agreement. FSPs suggested that UN agencies try to come up with a common contract template that can be adapted individually to include unique agency specifications in succeeding sections. There were other challenges identified in this new relationship, as shared in the learning workshop on electronic cash transfers organized by MercyCorps, in collaboration with OCHA and USAID-SIMM, last November 2014.40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>When?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-3.5a</td>
<td>Form an inclusive Task Force to begin collaboration on joint rapid needs and market assessment and monitoring tools contextualized to cash and regional-to-local market systems.</td>
<td>CWG Steering Committee</td>
<td>Within preparedness timeframe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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40 One Year Later: Lessons in Haiyan.
This would reduce the footprint in disaster-affected areas and prevent survey-fatigue among key informants. The CWG Steering Committee is best placed to initiate this, given its strategic composition and mandate. CWG member agencies could establish a pre-agreed collaboration arrangement to pool resources to conduct rapid market assessments/analysis pre and post disaster, leveraging the strength of individual agencies in monitoring sector-specific markets. Also with permanent seats in the Committee are: CaLP, which can provide technical support; and UNOCHA, which can ensure that such arrangement is endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team and plugged into inter-agency, inter-cluster coordination mechanisms. This forum would need to actively engage with representatives from key government agencies: DTI, DA, DOLE; and from regional/provincial chambers of commerce also mandated to work on varied aspects of markets including but not limited to price control and varied aspects of quality assurance.

Map out sources of secondary data – other government and non-govt. sources of market information for use during emergency and preparedness initiatives alike.

The Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office is maintaining a website with price monitoring charts of basic consumer goods across the country. The site pulls together in one place the prices of basic commodities released to the public weekly by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health and Department of Energy (DE). The website is: http://pcdspo.gov.ph/projects/price-monitoring-charts-of-basic-consumer-goods/.

This data could be used as a starting point for price and availability monitoring of food and basic commodities in disaster-prone localities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R-3.5b</th>
<th>Fund an EMMA training and pilot for the Department of Trade and Industries (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture (DA).</th>
<th>Donors, CaLP, DTI, DA, CWG</th>
<th>Within preparedness timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

DTI maintains up-to-date data on consumer goods prices and broader market considerations, except for food commodities, which is the purview of the DA. Through this training, the government could appreciate its position even more and take a proactive role in addressing market related concerns and ensuring that market prices are stable.

Both DTI and DA have the authority to put a price freeze on food and non-food items, and both have regional field offices across the country. Both government agencies have a lot of learning to bring to the table; DTI became a government cluster lead agency for the early recovery phase during Haiyan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R-3.5c</th>
<th>Form a Task Force to initiate the creation of a widely vetted common contract template between humanitarian agencies and FSPs</th>
<th>CWG SC &amp; Members, HCT</th>
<th>Within preparedness timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Mercy Corps hosted a learning event focused on this new relationship between cash transfer agencies and FSPs with electronic transfer capability. One output of the workshop was a Minimum Requirements checklist for both agency and FSP guiding the engagement requirements and processes between this two stakeholders. This would be a good reference for developing a common contract template intended to shorten the
The contractual process between the two parties.

The Cash Working Group Steering Committee has already met a few times since the beginning of 2015 and this is one of the priority preparedness activities of the CWG as agreed by both member agencies and member FSPs.

### R-3.5d

**Institutionalize mapping of FSPs nationwide to include GPS coordinates of all branches, min./max. capacity to disburse cash per day, and other key data as necessary for an effective CTP**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|
| **BSP, OCHA, CWG-SC** | **Within preparedness timeframe** |

This could be a collaboration between BSP, OCHA and the FSPs with Yolanda experience. BSP, as part of its regulatory role, is already collecting branch-level information from all FSPs on a regular basis and could expand this slightly by requiring FSPs to provide GPS coordinates for geo-tagging of branches for a more accurate mapping. BSP and OCHA could sign an MOA to share this data, with OCHA essentially being the mapping arm of BSP in this undertaking. This data would be very useful in real-time update of branch status post disaster. This could eventually be expanded to include microfinance institutions, larger merchant partners, and other remittance agents.

There was an attempt in the early weeks of the Haiyan response to centrally collect this data through the CWG. And while there were FSPs, which submitted data, which did not always match the facts on the ground. This initial nationwide mapping needs to happen during preparedness, and is best institutionalized within the BSP, with support from OCHA and the CWG. This way, even the process of collecting real-time branch data update from FSPs in the immediate aftermath of a disaster becomes an SOP.

### R-3.5e

**Form a Task Force to initiate dialogue between humanitarian agencies and development partners on how to simplify/de-conflict emergency employment through CFW**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|
| **CWG-SC, DOLE, DSWD, TESDA, ILO, UNDP,** | **Within preparedness timeframe** |

In order to avoid distorting the labour market as it did during Haiyan, the Cash Working Group Steering Committee could form a Task Force that would look into coming up with a guidance on emergency CFW, and cash-for-training. The Task Force could deliberate on a standard payment range for emergency employment through CFW, instead of adhering to the varying regional/provincial, rural/urban minimum wage rates across the country, which made it challenging to standardize wage rates. In addition, the CWG Task Force could work with TESDA in drawing up a hierarchy of payment commensurate to skills set/level, such as trainer or team leadership roles. Key outputs would include consideration to setting a labor price ceiling as part of the guidance, establish agreements with workplace certification bodies, particularly for an emergency context. The Government would then consolidate and provides guidance on engagement with various certification bodies as they deem fit.
3.6 THE JOURNEY OF CASH: FROM BENEFACTOR TO BENEFICIARY

The journey of cash from the benefactor to the beneficiary was successful but not without its challenges. Donor restrictions, agency internal complexities, relationships with the FSP and the geographical location of the beneficiary are among the factors that facilitated or challenged the process of delivering cash. Where this processes worked positively, the success was attributed one of the following factors; donor flexibility, pre-existing relationships with the FSP, agency political good will to implement CTP, defined Standard operational procedures (SOP), and more efficient payment mechanisms. Many agencies took it upon themselves to assure the effective delivery of cash by putting in place procedures that ensured that money was regularly transferred, that payments were made on time, that beneficiaries did not have to travel long distances to collect the cash and that they felt safe at payment points. Some agencies did establish a humanitarian customer care desk at the points of payment providing real-time solutions to arising challenges.

3.6.1 Highlights

**Donor Restrictions**

- Delayed programme start up attributable to lengthy contract negotiation processes; to secure funding and to formally engage FSPs presented some agencies the dilemma as to whether to keep the initial project objective despite the evolving context or renegotiate to suit the context. The latter would have been ideal, but in reality it’s a process laden with ambiguity where the grant re-award is not always guaranteed. Most donors are reportedly more flexible with the changes in activities as opposed to the change in programme objectives since consideration of the latter means a redesign and perhaps a new programme. With time, cash that was meant for the emergency phase of the response was delivered towards or during the recovery stage. While it was in some instances still relevant to the context, beneficiaries did miss out on the opportunity at the appropriate and intended time. It was therefore more of an upward than downward accountability trend.

- Some donor agencies provide funds in tranches requiring agencies to liquidate one tranche before accessing the next. This was not always feasible particularly for fast paced Cash Transfer programmes with a six months implementation period. In many instances this led to delays in implementation. To remedy, many agencies with capacity and access to unrestricted funds prepositioned cash for this use, others with more flexible donors i.e. ECHO\(^41\) negotiated to receive the cash up front, while for some, it was easier to handle in-kind social transfers instead.

\(^{41}\) ECHO grants up to 80% of the grant amount in advance.
**FSP Market Engagement – The demand supply equation.**

- The conduciveness of CTP in the Philippines is facilitated in part by the presence of a very sophisticated cash transfer industry. With technology, the payment options are not only getting better but also diverse – mostly demand driven. Nevertheless, the Haiyan response put a strain on these resources particularly at the onset, where at least 40 individual agencies took to establishing individual contractual relationships with FSPs; potentially demanding 40+ different products with agency specific internal controls. While there was not much difference in their intended outcome this process resulted into an overload with the key FSPs. The result was a delayed start up coupled with lengthy design and contract negotiation processes. One of the proposals floated by the FSPs is the possibility of having one contract template from which modifications would be made to suit agency specific requirements on product design and internal controls.

**Internal Organizational Processes.**

- The success of CTP is largely dependent on the organizational leadership and goodwill in support of cash transfers as an appropriate response modality. In the case of PRC, leadership appreciation of CTP supported the uptake of a tedious preparedness process. This led to the design of a response framework including the development of SOPs and other preparatory initiatives that made the launch of cash transfers at the onset of Yolanda simpler, faster, with extensive coverage. For many agencies, the lack of specific policies institutionalizing cash transfers within their regular organizational processes made the movement of in-kind transfers a more appealing yet not so effective option.

**Risk management**

- Risks associated with successful delivery of cash exist albeit in varying degrees. Arguably all forms of aid are at risk of diversion and fraud. Despite having mitigation strategies, none of the agencies present at the workshop reported to have carried out a risk analysis. The mitigation strategies, were largely based on perceived risks as opposed to real risks. The resultant effect was a delay in the delivery of cash particularly where more than necessary internal control measures plagued the process. This was common among those that served in far flung areas, as most of the FSPs worked with the cooperatives and other local vendors to deliver cash. While the delivery of cash was achieved, the journey was described to be more than challenging. The process was marred with uncoordinated efforts geared to mitigate perceived risks thereby lengthening the journey. For example, in the rural areas, cooperatives kept their pre Yolanda threshold of the amount of cash transferred from banks in urban centers per day, while the demand for cash was higher. If the idea was to limit the amount of cash in the local FSP offices, carrying a larger amount which could also have been distributed in one day could have served the purpose.
Table 3.6: THE JOURNEY OF CASH
Good Practice, Lesson, and Recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.6 a</td>
<td>Preposition of FSPs enabled agencies have a quick launch.</td>
<td>When agencies base mitigation strategies on perceived risks, there is a likelihood that this does not match the real risks and could potentially result into a delivery constraint. There is a real risk of having unnecessary internal controls assure the process of the cash transfers, which may result in delay or even transfer risks to the beneficiaries. For example, where cash reached the beneficiary late because the banks could not open before a certain time and the cooperatives had limited capacity to preposition huge amounts of money over time. This is a risk transferred to the beneficiary to bear.</td>
<td>Acquire more flexible donor policies during the distribution of cash. Individual agencies. During preparedness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.6 b</td>
<td>Private Public partnerships could ease the journey of cash.</td>
<td>Mitigation strategies need to be based on real risks.</td>
<td>Carry out a risk analysis and draw out a plan. Agencies. Preparatory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just like the preposition of in kind goods, the pre engagement of FSPs enabled a quick launch. Agencies that had preexisting agreements reported being able to deliver cash in one to two weeks’ time after formally signing the contracts as opposed to those who had to sign new agreements during which it took no less than one month. Agencies that had preexisting agreements reported being able to deliver cash in one to two weeks’ time after formally signing the contracts as opposed to those who had to sign new agreements during which it took no less than one month.

In far flung areas, one of the main concerns was the perceived insecurity particularly for the distribution of large amounts of cash. WFP in collaboration with the Local Government Unit authority was able to establish new payment points and reach beneficiaries that were in far flung areas. The Government did provide security, facilitating payment thereby reducing the time spent by beneficiaries travelling to the payment points.

Donor restrictions vary, and may impede implementation. Identifying and advocating for ease of the limiting restriction jointly perhaps through the CWG, would ensure an enabling environment for CTP implementation. Alongside, agencies need identify strategies that would mitigate this effects, for example requesting for the amount needed for the cash distribution upfront would reduce the complications that result from delays in liquidation and thereby delaying implementation. ECHO for example provides 80% of the cash grant upfront enabling a smooth implementation process. Another example would be for agencies to design programmes with an objective that takes into consideration that cash is usable throughout the continuum of the response and multisectorally. This would ensure more appropriate programme design and flexibility to adapt to changing context during the response.
mitigation strategy

Agencies need to carry out real risk analysis. This will ensure that mitigation strategies are appropriate and reduce challenges experienced throughout the journey of cash from the benefactor to beneficiary.

### 3.7 POST-DISTRIBUTION MONITORING (PDM)

Monitoring and evaluation is a core component of any cash transfer programme as a tool to assure not only the appropriateness but also the effectiveness and efficiency of the response including but not limited to determining how cash is spent against people’s needs, vulnerabilities and coping strategies, how it impacts recipient households, markets, local contexts and communities. CTP without the monitoring and evaluation component runs the risk of causing harm to people and markets, as well as potential diversion. Agencies, which have been implementing emergency CTP even before Haiyan, have integrated M&E throughout their programme cycles, however, it is beyond the scope of this report to provide overall analysis of M&E results.

Some agencies did share results of their post-distribution monitoring (PDM) and lessons learnt in the process. IFRC-PRC, Oxfam, WFP, Helpage-COSE were among the agencies, who provided unconditional cash grants within the first few months of the response and conducted PDMs within two weeks of delivery.

It should be noted that there were non-traditional actors, such as faith-based organizations and private companies, who distributed cash in the early weeks, but did not conduct any formal monitoring after payment. However, random interviews with affected communities who received cash, and local media reports, indicate an overwhelming appreciation of the cash distribution of these actors.

In the context of the Philippines, it was appropriate that many of the cash transfer assistance was coursed through the female head of household. While communities weren’t opposed to men claiming cash grants, it was expressed that it is better to distribute to women, who generally look after the wellbeing of the entire family. This was consistent with the guidance issued by the National Advisory Committee of the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s (DSWD’s) 4Ps social safety net programme, recommending that cash should be given to women.¹²

Some of the challenges reported by beneficiaries in the PDMs had to do with access to cash payout points, particularly for those living in remote upland areas. They had to travel long distances to receive cash in some instances over 6 hours. There were also reports of payout points not having enough cash to disburse on some days. This was reportedly due to humanitarian agencies partnering with local remittance agencies, pawnshops, door-to-door courier services, who have not been involved in delivering humanitarian assistance before, on top of their regular day-to-day business.

**Monitoring Highlights**

Following are the highlights of some of the PDMs conducted early on in the response.

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¹² NAC Guidance
PDM findings

IFRC-PRC (Dec. 2013 to March 2014)\textsuperscript{33}

- Implemented unconditional/multi-purpose cash grants in the emergency phase to assist more than 61,000 vulnerable households meet their basic needs.
- PDM indicated that affected Filipino recipients were appreciative of the cash assistance of IFRC through the Philippine Red Cross and generally preferred it over in-kind goods as it allowed them the flexibility to prioritize individual household needs. The unconditional cash grant was mostly used to cover food needs, house repair, education fees, medical payments.
- Around 80 percent of respondents stated that all affected people in the community have been included in the beneficiary lists provided by barangay officials.
- More than 76 percent understood why they were selected to receive the cash; while more than 90 percent across the regions thought the selection process was fair.
- Nearly 100 percent of those interviewed for the PDM said that they found most of what they needed in the markets/stores.
- Around 63 percent did not notice prices increasing after the cash transfer, and in areas where they did, 93 percent of recipients said they did not think that the cash transfer was the reason for the price increase.

WFP (December 2013 to February 2014)\textsuperscript{44}

- WFP provided a top-up emergency cash assistance of PHP1,300 per selected 4Ps household to complement the regular government grant. WFP also partnered with NGOs to reach non 4P beneficiaries who were also been severely affected by the super typhoon.
- In total, nearly 530,000 people living across 61 municipalities in the Visayas region were supported with WFP cash assistance over a three-month period.
- PDM indicated that WFP appropriately timed the phase-in of cash across locations. In total, 93% of cash recipients reported access to functional markets, while over 96% of the recipients indicated that there was a sufficient availability of their preferred food in these markets. When asked how they utilised their cash grants, 86% of the households indicated that food was their top priority, followed by transportation (52%) and education (45%). Other household expenditures in order of priority were health/medical care (32%), hygiene items (29%), and clothing (22%). Other uses of the cash were for savings, debt payment, and transportation.


\textsuperscript{44}A Year After the Storm: The WFP
### Table 3.7: POST-DISTRIBUTION MONITORING (PDM)

**Good Practice, Lesson, and Recommendation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.7a</td>
<td>Agencies sharing, findings and challenges in the PDM process early on, allowing for time to refine tool</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IFRC-PRC and Oxfam, who were among the first agencies to provide unconditional/multi-purpose cash assistance and conduct PDMs, shared their findings early on, as well as their challenges in conducting the PDM. For the most part, the tools of these two agencies were very similar and their PDM findings were consistent, illustrating the feasibility of standardizing this tool across CTP actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.7b</td>
<td>Monitoring of impact of the cash grant on markets and community provided agencies information assuring Do no Harm practices are integrated in programming.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF-ACF monitoring tool integrated the impact on the markets, household and community as a way to monitor if the program was potentially harmful. This experiences show how monitoring of CTP can be used to enhance accountability to beneficiaries thereby keeping in check the do no harm approaches employed.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparing market prices to the cash grant assured the programme that even with fluctuating prices households were able to afford at least 85% of the items intended at a minimum. Monitoring the potential of tension at the household level as a result of the cash grant showed that tension though limited (less than 4%) was common in complex household situations where more than one household existed under the same roof and was mostly related to prioritizing expenditure. Tension with communities were attributed to exclusion mostly migration related.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP 3.7c</td>
<td>Maintenance of the expenditure diary by Programme beneficiaries ensured a more accurate recall on use of cash.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As part of its financial management training and accountability processes, Pantawid beneficiaries are encouraged to maintain expenditure diaries. This not only serve as a planning tool but also enables them manage and account for expenditures more effectively. This was found to be useful during PDMs particularly in areas where beneficiaries expressed challenges in recalling how the cash was used?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L-3.7a</td>
<td>Beneficiaries found it challenging to recall how cash was spent when PDMs are conducted two weeks after cash distribution.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oxfam and other agencies reported beneficiary survey fatigue. According to beneficiaries, this was a time when there were varied assessments being undertaken and multiple interventions being undertaken. It was not always easy to remember what they spent the cash on, specifically, and how much they paid, two weeks later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-3.7b</td>
<td>Do not underestimate the time taken to train staff, who would be conducting the PDM survey. Marathon trainings would lead to poor data quality.</td>
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</table>
|        | Empower staff conducting the PDM to probe a little, to feel comfortable paraphrasing in the vernacular some of the questions, and to triangulate data. Given that Haiyan
struck several regions with different dialects, PDMs had to be translated into these dialects, and conducted by local people, who spoke the local languages, and then transcribed into English, likely leading to diluted translations of the intended meanings.

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>When?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-3.7a</td>
<td>Agree on and develop one common PDM template for unconditional/multipurpose cash.</td>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Standardization of monitoring tools in order to aggregate results in the Haiyan response was a challenge by the lack of comparability of data—as different agencies report on different units of account (household, family, individual). The national cash working group steering committee could designate a sub-working group to work on this tool. The tool would look into both economic and social impact of the cash programme. Oxfam and PRC shared their PDM tools with the CWG in the early days of the response. During preparedness, these tools, along with DSWD-Pantawid’s Spot Check form could be reviewed to combine into one common tool.</td>
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3.8 COORDINATION

Coordinating cash-based interventions in Haiyan highlighted many challenges that were not unique to the Philippines but have been experienced in the past responses, where CTP was implemented at scale. Given that for the first time and in an L-3 category sudden-onset emergency, CTP was used at scale—coordination was pertinent and therefore at the forefront of CTP discussions.

Donors funded individual agencies’ deployment of cash experts to Haiyan. For the first time, both OCHA and CaLP deployed surge capacity to the Philippines specifically to provide strategic and technical coordination of CTP in anticipation of the collective appreciation of how the country context might make it highly conducive to cash transfer programming. OCHA’s cash coordinator position also supported coordination with Government and linkages to FSPs for effective delivery of CTP.

While such attention to the importance of coordination and the deployment of cash focal points across agencies, including a dedicated OCHA Cash Coordinator, who became the de facto Chair of the national Cash Working Group, led to some good practices, it also created unreasonable expectations of harmonized systems and mechanisms that did not account for the following:

- The realities of a sudden-onset response in an archipelago like the Philippines, where contexts vary from province to province, region to region; where there were seven response hubs at one point in the relief phase;
- The well-known resilience of Filipinos—who are quick to fix, accustomed to an average of 20 typhoons a year—leading to rapidly changing needs, vulnerabilities and capacities;
- The fact that CTP remains to be a fairly new modality of aid, with in-kind assistance still dominating a greater proportion of the total relief assistance even in Haiyan where CTP was used at scale;
Cash coordination globally is still mainly happening outside of the humanitarian coordination architecture through the formation of ad hoc CWGs that before Haiyan were mostly led by operational NGOs; and

First-time engagements between humanitarian agencies and local stakeholders, such as the government and financial service providers, naturally resulted in some “teething pain”.

Coordination Highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dedicated Cash Coordinator at OCHA; CaLP presence</th>
<th>OCHA, CaLP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The presence of a Cash Coordinator, a position deployed for the first time by OCHA, working at the national level sent an initial message that there would be attention focused on strategic coordination of CTPs for the response.</td>
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<td>2. The deployment of the CaLP Asia focal point and technical advisor complemented that overall sense that operational agencies would be provided coordination support both on strategic and technical issues.</td>
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<td>3. Although there was confusion in the early days as to the specific roles and functions of each organization and how they intersect, there was appreciation at the agency-level for a dedicated cash coordination role that took on the responsibility from operational NGOs, whose capacities were stretched with the multiple hub-level response required in Haiyan.</td>
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<td>4. The Cash Coordinator played a role in bringing cash discussions in the three clusters—Food Security and Agriculture (FSAC), Shelter and Early Recovery and Livelihoods (ER&amp;L)—where partner agencies aligned cash transfer programming.</td>
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<td>5. The attachment of cash coordination to OCHA provided a neutral focus on CTP coordination and a model that facilitated the linkage of the national CWG to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group, and the formal coordination framework of the humanitarian system, including the Humanitarian Country Team, (HCT).</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>National and Sub-national cash coordination</th>
<th>Partner agencies supported by OCHA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Given the geographically staggered devastation of Haiyan, the response required the establishment of regional hubs. Two sub-national cash coordination groups were formed: one in Region VI co-chaired by Save the Children and WFP; the other one in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which had a per-meeting rotational chairmanship agreement.</td>
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<td>7. The dedicated Cash Coordinator based in Manila travelled to the two regions to attend/facilitate CWG meetings and provided support remotely.</td>
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<td>8. Information sharing across these cash coordination groups happened during the response, but not consistently.</td>
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45 ECHO ERC Philippines Case Study on Cash Coordination
9. The national CWG offered an open platform for humanitarian actors, government agencies, private sector / financial service providers, and microfinance institutions to interact, exchange ideas, and build partnerships. Engagement with the Government led to the endorsement of guidelines and linkages with the Social protection framework earlier on the response.

Table 3.8: COORDINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Good Practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP-3.8a</td>
<td>Deployment of a dedicated Cash Coordinator with in-depth knowledge of the country and the context; longer assignment (one year) allowed coordinator to initiate institutionalization and preparedness activities based on lessons during the response</td>
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</table>

The dedicated Cash Coordinator initially came on a 3-month surge capacity contract, but was extended by OCHA up to one year. This allowed the Cash Coordinator to contribute to key preparedness activities including institutionalization of the CWG, Capacity building and advocacy for Government leadership in CTP. In addition, this period provided an opportunity for OCHA Philippines to review the experience and adopt good practices towards better preparedness in the provision of strategic coordination for CTP in the next response.

A structured process for knowledge transfer: Haiyan was a revolving door of surge capacity, which actually contributed to the challenges of coordinating CTP in the early days. The lack of a clear communication strategies within and outside of the organizations implementing CTP coupled with a high staff turnover undermined the potential of nurturing ideas with potential for improving coordination of CTP. In the months leading to the end of the contract, the dedicated Cash Coordinator worked with OCHA’s Head of Office to identify and collaborate with a cash “understudy” amongst the national staff. This purposeful handover to a national counterpart would ensure that institutional knowledge base on cash is retained at country level.

GP-3.8b | Engagement with Government earlier on in the response endorsed their potential leadership for CTP, encouraged the appreciation of CTP as an effective response modality and prepared them for preparedness efforts post Haiyan.

At the onset of the response to Yolanda, a special meeting of the National Advisory Committee (NAC) members endorsed CTP implementation guidelines, developed in collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) and Cash Learning Partnership (CALP) in response to Haiyan. This was a recognizable step towards a more coordinated CTP and the formalization of potential Government leadership in CTP. In the days that followed, the use of the CCT Framework to deliver cash, by two UN agencies enhanced Government appreciation of CTP as a response tool. This paved the way for post Haiyan institutional processes including the exploration of links between the Governments led CCT and the Emergency CTP, capacity building on CTP for Government staff, and DSWD eventual engagement as...
an active participant in the CWG.

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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<th>Who?</th>
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<tr>
<td>GP-3.8c</td>
<td>Continued dialogue and engagement of FSPs throughout the response and for preparedness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>This is a concrete engagement with a segment of the private sector, who have the capacity and national coverage to help scale-up and speed up cash-based interventions</td>
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### Lessons

**L-3.8a** Harmonization of CTP approaches is unlikely to happen under duress. Investments in preparedness are a key ingredient for an effective CTP in the future.

Given that the context was highly conducive to cash and there was sufficient presence of cash expertise deployed to the response, there were expectations that harmonized approaches should have happened during the response. To a certain degree, this happened, albeit not consistently. There were agreements in Tacloban, for example, amongst DSWD, DOLE and the cash partner agencies of the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster, to standardize CFW cash transfer value to the urban minimum wage rate of Php 260, instead of having two rates, including the rural one. In a rapid onset disaster in an archipelago, such as the Philippines, the best time to harmonize CTP strategies is during preparedness. Similarly engagements of experts needs to happen during peace times to provide an opportunity for enhanced capacity that could be deployed in a response.

**L-3.8b** CTP guidance developed at the national level, while important, will be insufficient. Cash coordination mechanisms must be established at sub-national levels to ensure operational agencies have the space to discuss issues, share tools and information, and develop guidance more relevant and appropriate to regional/local context.

The Philippine government is highly decentralized, such that centrally/nationally based data and guidance on CTP may not necessarily be sufficient in meeting quickly evolving needs at the ground level. Thus, LGUs being closer to the ground are a pertinent source of information to be considered.

**L-3.8c** An effective coordination structure should establish a formal link with the humanitarian coordination structure so as to create a strategic impact between the operational than strategic coordination efforts of CTP.

Even before Typhoon Haiyan, humanitarian actors in the Philippines formed a Cash Working Group (CWG) to help coordinate their activities in response to several natural disasters. This served mostly the operational aspects of CTP and lacked an advocacy platform as it was outside of the coordination mechanisms. The CTP coordinator building on this preexisting forum facilitated the linkage of the national CWG to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group, and the formal coordination framework of the humanitarian system, including the Humanitarian Country Team, (HCT). The CWG has now the Government represented by DSWD in its steering committee. Under the leadership of OCHA and the steering group, the CWG has continued to focus on preparedness activities. It remains unclear how this would function in a similar context but looks promising.
### R-3.8a
**Agencies should purposely structure approaches to ensure continuity of programmes post implementation.**

At the very least, in contexts where strategic cash coordination is led by OCHA, the dedicated coordinator if deployed through surge, must endeavor to work with a longer term counterpart in the OCHA country office to ensure sustainability and institutional knowledge base on cash remains in-country. Where possible, CWG steering committees should be directly linked to national operations to ensure sustainability. This should not only be limited to the coordination office but other players in CTP alike.

### R-3.8b
**Link CWG to formal humanitarian coordination system, namely the Inter-cluster Coordination Group, if activated, the HC and HCT**

While this exists, it’s still in the infant stages and yet to be formalized. Stakeholders need to advocate for this formal linkages and recognition in favor of strategic CTP coordination. While the global coordination structures continue to be defined, this perhaps is an opportunity for the Philippines building on post Yolanda period to design a context specific coordination strategy. OCHA as a member of the Steering Committee and as de facto chair of the CWG during emergencies must ensure that the CWG is represented in ICC meetings both at national and sub-national levels during the response. OCHA must also ensure that the CWG preparedness activities are endorsed and regularly reported to the HCT.

### R-3.8c
**Nationalize and institutionalize the CWG Steering Committee, and establish predictable leadership of cash coordination mechanisms at the sub-national level.**

This would ensure that: (i) the CWG will not disband as it did before Yolanda; (ii) important preparedness activities are taken up; and (iii) they have the support of their respective organizations to devote part of their time to CWG work.

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**Note:** For more on cash coordination in Haiyan, see CWG section under “Institutionalization”; and the independent evaluation of cash coordination in Haiyan commissioned by CaLP and UNHCR: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cash-coordination-philippines-web.pdf
4. Institutionalization: Building on Opportunities from the Haiyan Experience

Following the UNICEF-OCHA Lessons Learnt workshop in Nov. 2014, identified gaps and blockages shared by CTP humanitarian agencies during the event fed into several institutionalization activities with the Government of the Philippines and the national Cash Working Group (CWG) that took place in the succeeding months, Dec. 2014 through April 2015.

These institutionalization efforts have led to more definitive linkages around preparedness activities between government, the private sector, in-country UN agencies and NGOs, and the Humanitarian Country Team. Moreover, they have led to two important developments: (i) the sensitization of key local stakeholders to cash transfer programming as an effective, more accountable emergency response modality; and (ii) the appreciation amongst key government agencies—DSWD, DTI, Banko Sentral—and financial service providers/private sector of the vital role they each play in implementing a cash-based humanitarian intervention at scale; and (iii) the importance of coordination around preparedness activities.

4.1 GOVERNMENT

4.1.1 National-level training on emergency CTP for key social safety net programme staff

Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Programme is the flagship social protection programme of the GoP. It has been implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) since 2008 through a conditional cash transfer (CCT) infrastructure. Beneficiaries of the programme were identified through DSWD’s targeting system, Listahanan (formerly known as the National Household Targeting System, or NHTS).

What happened during the Haiyan response?

The Pantawid CCT infrastructure, which had been operational for more than five years, offered a platform to mount a scaled-up and speedy response to provide immediate assistance to vulnerable households, already targeted as such pre-Haiyan. Two UN agencies, with pre-existing agreements with DSWD—WFP and UNICEF—used its CCT infrastructure to deliver unconditional cash assistance to typhoon survivors.

WFP

- WFP initiated an unconditional cash transfer assistance “piggy-backing” on Pantawid’s CCT platform, which had built-in partnership agreements with financial delivery mechanisms.
- The cash transfer aimed to meet additional food and non-food needs of Pantawid beneficiaries affected by Haiyan, as well as to stimulate the economy.
- Over a three-month period (Dec. 2013-Feb. 2014), WFP distributed a top-up emergency cash assistance of Php1,300 per Pantawid household to supplement the government grant.
- In total, more than half a million Filipinos living across 61 municipalities in the Visayas region received unconditional cash assistance from WFP for a three-month period.
- WFP’s cash-based intervention was worth around Php260 million (US$6 million).

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A Year After the Storm: The WFP Haiyan Report
• WFP also partnered with NGOs to provide unconditional cash grants to those who are not Pantawid beneficiaries, but were severely affected by Haiyan.

UNICEF
• UNICEF’s Emergency Unconditional Cash Transfer (EUCT) Programme covered five selected Local Government Units (LGUs) in Eastern Samar. Targeting 5801 HH (Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program beneficiaries) to receive cash grants of $100 over a period of 6 months. This expansion builds on experience gained during the implementation of the earlier phase of the project in Leyte and contributes to UNICEF’s strategic response for the welfare of children. In particular, this expansion sought to capitalize on the recovery and rehabilitation phases of the response in Typhoon Haiyan-affected areas.
• The aim of this cash transfer initiative was to increase vulnerable households’ income stability thereby assuring increased food and essential non-food security (short-term objective), with the end goal of contributing to the development outcomes of poor households, and in particular, children (long-term). As such, the size of the transfer was based on the minimum amount required to meet basic food and essential non-food needs while also taking into consideration other support given by other agencies.
• Having enjoyed a long term working relationship even within other sectors, and both (UNICEF and DSWD) being proponents of social protection framework, the agreement which was the basis of this partnership in response to Yolanda formally recognized DSWD social protection framework as a potential for use in emergencies. In this regard, both agencies, agreed that it would be beneficial to collect evidence that would inform the calibration of this structure into an effective emergency response framework while taking into consideration the bigger picture.
• In this regard, there was a heavy deployment of resources in support of monitoring to gather evidence that would promote discussions on calibrating this framework for use in emergency responses. Separately through its social policy unit, UNICEF funded 40 LGUs in other recovery and preparedness activities including resumption of much needed services and collection of data through the CBMS that would be used to prioritize key development issues for planning purposes. Additionally, UNICEF, worked with DSWD in the initial roll out of the social protection framework; a guide for local Government units. UNICEF was in a strategic position to achieve because of the mandate that addresses both emergency and development needs. (Details of this are covered in sections ahead.)

What happened after the Haiyan response?

It was clear after some stocktaking following the emergency response that the UN agencies ad hoc engagement of the CCT platform was not without its challenges, given that it is not designed for emergency responses. DSWD was keen to learn from the experience and expressed interest in a training on emergency CTP.

UNICEF, the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) Asia Regional Office, and OCHA collaborated with DSWD to organize a CaLP Level 1 Training for key staff involved in the implementation involved in the implementation of the Pantawid programme, and who were also designated to work with WFP and UNICEF in the delivery of unconditional/multipurpose cash assistance to Haiyan survivors at scale, through their CCT infrastructure.

Outputs:
The two-day training had two concrete outputs: a concept note for the development of an emergency version of the Pantawid infrastructure, and a working draft of a resolution that would institutionalize the emergency platform for unconditional/multi-purpose cash assistance within the Philippine government’s social protection agency, DSWD and a policy brief. UNICEF has been working closely with DSWD in developing these outputs.

It was the first time for UNICEF Philippines to mount such a scaled-up cash transfer programming in the country and it has been actively collecting lessons and good practices from its CTP experience with DSWD, as well as with its partner NGO, ACF. This is part of UNICEF’s own organizational preparedness and efforts to integrate CTP within its operational systems. Moreover, UNICEF is also invested in supporting the GoP’s expressed efforts to mainstream social protection into its disaster risk reduction and disaster response management protocols.

4.1.2 LGU-level training to mainstream social protection into the operational framework

LGUs are autonomous from central government; and are mandated to deliver various aspects of basic social services. They are also the first responders in an emergency response, mandated by the 1991 Local Government Code, to be responsible for the overall wellbeing and social protection of their barangays and their constituents.

What happened during the Haiyan response?

In the case of Typhoon Yolanda, however, LGU offices and officials became victims themselves of the devastating storm. As a result, not only was the emergency response capacity compromised, but also their revenue generation capacity adversely affected. This had serious implications on their capacity to implement their social protection amidst the Haiyan response.

UNICEF, as part of its Yolanda response strategy, provided assistance to affected LGUs to enable them to resume service provision and ensure that affected Filipinos quickly regained access to community and local government services.

UNICEF selected 40 LGUs across the path of Yolanda based on cumulative affected population that would yield optimal coverage in relation to UNICEF’s Strategic Response Plan (SRP) targets. LGUs in Regions, VI, VII and VIII received funds from UNICEF set aside to meet identified priority needs.

Apart from support to the traditional sectors of Health and Nutrition, as well as WASH, UNICEF’s Social Policy section has engaged DSWD and LGUs in a one-year initiative to support the government’s Child-responsive Planning and Development Package (CPDP). LGUs received funding that supported the collection and analysis of data through the use of the Community Based Management System (CBMS).

UNICEF’s comparative advantage was (a) the ability to design and test innovative approaches to improve delivery of social services at the LGU level; and (b) to influence central government and leverage resources to deliver results for children.

The CBMS is an organized way of collecting information at the local level for use of local government units, national government agencies, non-government organizations, and civil society for planning, programme implementation and monitoring. It encompasses the process of data collection, processing, validation, and integration of data in the local development processes (see Annex: CBMS FAQs)
CBMS seeks to address the existing data gaps at the local level for diagnosing the extent of poverty in determining its causes, formulating appropriate policies and programmes. The key feature of the process is that it: (a) Involves a census of all households in a community; (b) is LGU-based, promoting community participation—tapping existing LGU-personnel/community members as monitors; (c) has a core set of indicators, but flexible enough to accommodate additional indicators; and (d) establishes database at each geopolitical level.

CBMS work compliments the growing demand for local poverty statistics from various stakeholders particularly to improve poverty reduction initiatives, and to monitor poverty conditions of various sectors overtime. During an emergency, data generated from the local monitoring systems developed and refined regularly, can reduce the challenges of targeting, enabling a quick launching pad for beneficiary identification and validation, particularly for those agencies directly working with the LGUs. The targeting process will through the CBMS, be in a better position to take into consideration the effect of the disaster and preexisting poverty conditions.

UNICEF in collaboration with DSWD, also provided an initial roll out of the capacity building exercise for the Local Governance Units on the new social protection framework. While still in its infant roll-out stages, the social protection framework is a Government priority. Chapter 8 of the 2011–2016 development plan explicitly states that the social protection sector should ensure empowerment and protection of the poor, vulnerable, and disadvantaged individuals from all types of risks. Subsequently, the National Economic and Development Authority’s (NEDA) social development committee formulated an operational framework and strategy that was directly linked and placed within the overall inclusive development goals and overall poverty strategy of the country. To concretize this framework, social protection handbooks, under the leadership of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, were developed as primary references of local governance units (LGUs) in support of the framework roll-out. In addition to this training, UNICEF supported the printout of the SP manuals for distribution to LGUs. The Government plans it initial pilot roll out later in the year.

4.1.3 Data preparedness agreement between DSWD’s national targeting office and OCHA

What happened during the Haiyan response?

During the response, OCHA engaged the National Household Targeting Office (NHTO), as targeting was anticipated to be a concern, given the scale of Haiyan’s devastation. NHTO manages the Listahanan (formerly known as the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction, or NHTS-PR), the targeting arm of DSWD.

The targeting agency, which employs the Proxy Means Test statistical tool, identifies the poorest households by collecting data from all households in the municipalities/provinces identified as the poorest, to determine prospective beneficiaries of nationwide social protection programmes, social pension, rice subsidy for the poorest farmers and fisher folk (see Annex: NHTS-PR). Thus, the 4Ps beneficiaries data, is just a subset of the Listahanan data collection.

Listahanan is supposed to collect and validate its data every four years and was due for its second round of validation when Haiyan struck. Nevertheless, DSWD/NHTO conducted a rapid revalidation of its data, particularly of 4Ps beneficiaries, across the Haiyan affected areas and recognized that the data could be a valuable source for humanitarian actors’ targeting process, including those planning CTP.
The data, which covers not just the vulnerable 4Ps households, but also other poor households, who are non-4Ps, were collected through LGUs and provided to OCHA to aid mapping and geographic targeting. OCHA as de facto Chair of the national Cash Working Group, shared the maps with CWG members in the early months.

Some agencies expressed interest in accessing the data for triangulation with information they’ve collected on the ground. The government expressed willingness to share the data, but preferred to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with only one agency, as it would require a great deal of time and resources for the NHTO to sign multiple MoAs with different agencies requesting access to the data. More importantly, the government wanted to ensure data protection by coursing the requests through one humanitarian agency, which would take the role and responsibility of being the custodian of the data.

What happened after the Haiyan response?

In anticipation of NHTO’s plan to conduct its second round of validation in 2015 of the poorest households nationwide, OCHA signed a Memorandum of Agreement with DSWD. OCHA Philippines’ Information Management Unit has been undertaking data protection measures and establishing data access protocols to safeguard the information once it is shared by DSWD.

4.1.4 Potential collaboration between the Central Bank of the Philippines and the CWG

What happened during the Haiyan response?

FSPs are strictly bound by the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) regulation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP: Central Bank). Under this regulation, FSPs cannot issue bank cards to new customers without collecting 11 mandatory information/documentation requirements, including official state- or employer-issued identification cards. This means, FSPs would not be able to readily provide ATM cards to the majority of the targeted beneficiaries of humanitarian agencies, who lost everything to the storm. Humanitarian organizations did not completely understand this regulation, resulting in confusion and unrealistic expectations for cash disbursements and the requisite documentation for such transactions.

FSPs individually requested the Central Bank to relax and reduce the KYC requirements. BSP granted a special one-off provision for Typhoon Yolanda affected households, reducing KYC requirements from the mandatory 11 down to 3-5; and also allowing use of alternative IDs, such as local government signed clearance certificates and IDs provided by humanitarian agencies. This KYC relaxation facilitated registration and validation of targeted beneficiaries.47

What happened after the Haiyan response?

In April 2015, MercyCorps and OCHA, on behalf of the CWG and CWG Steering Committee Members, had preliminary discussions with Central Bank representatives to discuss the following:

- collaboration on mapping of FSP branch locations nationwide and their cash disbursement capacity per day

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47 One Year Later: e-Learning Workshop, 21 Nov. 2014, Cebu, Philippines and Learning Documentation
• BSP consideration of a policy to relax KYC regulation when a State of Calamity is declared by local authorities.

4.2 CASH WORKING GROUP & COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

4.2.1 Institutionalizing the Cash Working Group (CWG) — Dec. 2014-Feb. 2015
It was clear from the agencies, who participated in the UNICEF-UNOCHA Lessons Learnt Workshop last 18-19 Nov. 2014 that Haiyan offered an enormous wealth of lessons and opportunities. This was echoed in another learning workshop held the same week, organized by Mercy Corps, in collaboration with UNOCHA and USAID-SIMM, which focused on collecting lessons learnt from the electronic cash transfers to Haiyan survivors and the overall challenges in the partnership between humanitarian agencies and FSPs. 48

In addition, both learning events had specific recommendations for preparedness that would harness the nascent partnerships with the government and FSPs and benefit the whole community of practice, but that needed to be acted upon... but by whom?

Aside from the lessons and opportunities, Typhoon Haiyan also created an informal but solid group of Filipino cash practitioners affiliated with UN agencies and NGOs, who have had experience in smaller scale CTP in previous emergencies, but were “seasoned” by the scale and devastation of the disaster, as well as by the quality and variety of cash transfer programming that took place.

There was a collective resolve from these Filipino CTP practitioners—who regularly attended CWG meetings in Manila and freely shared information and experiences with peers during the response—not to allow the CWG to disband again, as it did before Yolanda.

Establishing and nationalizing the CWG Steering Committee
To ensure the sustainability and predictable leadership of the CWG for preparedness and during response, a nationalized Steering Committee was established in December 2014. The TOR was finalized in January 201549 with the following terms agreed upon:

• SC membership is restricted to Filipino staff representing in-country operational agencies, with experience in cash transfer programming, while membership to the CWG is open.
• Membership in the Steering Committee is contingent upon the submission of a signed Letter of Commitment by the Head/Country Representative of the institution. The Letter of Commitment submits the names of two Filipino staff (including alternate), stating institutional support of the Filipino staff’s participation in CWG meetings and CWG Steering Committee work.
• During emergency, OCHA will be the automatic chair of the national CWG and SC meetings in Manila. The SC will collectively determine leadership of sub-national CWGs.
• During peace time, chairmanship is rotational (quarterly) and OCHA will provide secretariat and information management support.

48 One Year Later: e-Learning Workshop, 21 Nov. 2014, Cebu, Philippines
49 Philippines CWG Steering Committee TOR
The SC meets every month to initiate a set of prioritized preparedness activities by establishing key sub-working groups; CWG meetings are quarterly.

- Decision making will be by majority vote.
- The SC is accountable to the broader CWG membership.
- The SC and CWG, through OCHA, will be linked to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group, the Emergency Preparedness Working Group and the Humanitarian Country Team at all times.

The Philippines CWG Steering Committee Members:

- Philippine Red Cross
- OCHA
- UNICEF
- WFP
- CaLP (if in-country)
- Oxfam
- World Vision
- Save the Children
- Plan
- ACF
- CARE

4.2.2 Cash Working Group: 1st preparedness meeting — March 2015

The first CWG preparedness meeting drew around 38 participants, including:

- Steering Committee Members, plus ICRC and IOM
- Government: representatives from DSWD’s social safety net Pantawid programme (4Ps), and the Department of Trade and Industries (DTI)
- Financial Service Providers: PhilPost, Mlhuillier, LBC, SMART, Globe
- OCHA’s Head of Office

Presentations and key outcomes:

- The CWG approved the Steering Committee’s TOR and preparedness priority activities.
- DSWD presented its plans to design an emergency unconditional cash transfer platform (EUCT) based on its experience in partnering with WFP and UNICEF during the Haiyan response, and expressed interest in being members of the CWG and potentially the SC in the future.
- DTI expressed interest in attending CWG meetings regularly, and its willingness to participate in a sub-working group dedicated to markets.
- Two agencies presented on their pilot innovations in partnership with international credit card companies: Oxfam with Visa, and World Vision with Mastercard.
- World Vision also presented the LMMS and there were discussions that the platform could be considered by DSWD for its future plans to upgrade data collection of crisis-affected Filipinos through the government’s paper-based tool, the Disaster Affected Family Access Card, better known as the DAFAC.
- OCHA’s Head of Office committed to including cash in the agenda of the next Humanitarian Country Team meeting, and presenting the CWG and its preparedness activities for endorsement by the HCT.

Planned Preparedness activities:

- Nationwide mapping of FSPs: a collaboration amongst OCHA’s Information Management Unit, FSP members of the CWG, and potentially Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). In relation to this, advocacy with BSP to consider developing a force majeure policy that automatically reduces the number of Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirements when the Office of the
President or regional/provincial/local authorities declare certain areas in a State of Calamity.

- Standardization of cash transfer modalities terminology in the 3W template
- Establishment of two sub-working groups: one led by Oxfam to initiate the development of a common contract template between humanitarian agencies and FSPs; and one co-led by WFP and Oxfam, and potentially with DTI, plus coordination support from OCHA to develop a common market assessment tool contextualized to the Philippines and with SOPs around implementation.

4.2.3 Information management and Knowledge-sharing platform

Key developments:

- OCHA has developed an information graphic on cash and is building a dedicated cash page on the humanitarianresponse website.\(^50\)
- CaLP’s Asia Regional Office and OCHA are collaborating to build a Philippines CWG page on the CaLP website. CaLP has also offered to establish a knowledge-sharing platform for the CWG and the broader community of cash practitioners in the Philippines. This provides a space for sharing information, tools, minute meetings, and other documents, particularly during an emergency response, when there is a need to connect the national CWG with sub-national working groups.

4.2.4 HCT endorsement of the CWG and its preparedness activities — April 2015

- OCHA’S Head of Office presented the CWG and its preparedness activities to the Philippines Humanitarian Country Team. There was a common agreement amongst heads of agencies that cash transfer is an appropriate response modality in the country. The Resident Coordinator and HCT members endorsed the CWG and its preparedness activities and requested regular update on their progress.\(^51\)

5. Conclusion

The Haiyan experience produced many highlights. At the forefront is the entire humanitarian community’s collective effort, including those of local stakeholders and non-traditional actors, to deliver a speedy and scaled up assistance to the millions of affected Filipinos.

There is overwhelming evidence from evaluations, post-distribution monitoring results, and focused group discussions indicating that cash-based interventions did contribute significantly to meeting the immediate needs of affected communities and to their ability to self-recover.

Although not without challenges, the scaled-up use of CTP can be attributed to partnerships between humanitarian agencies and two important local actors: the government and the private sector, specifically local financial service providers.

\(^{50}\) http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/philippines/cash-working-group

\(^{51}\) Ibid
These actors were provided the space to freely interact and exchange issues and ideas and to coordinate through the humanitarian and government cluster systems, as well as the national and sub-national cash coordination groups formed during the response.

The challenge now is how to translate the rich lessons and good practices coming out of these partnerships borne in Haiyan into coordinated preparedness activities. Who will be the catalyst, the watchdog that will ensure these key in-country stakeholders remain engaged?

In many contexts, cash coordination bodies lose momentum when the emergency response window closes and long-term recovery work sets in. When humanitarian surge capacities leave, donor funds dwindle and agencies’ resources shrink back to their original smaller size.

While this routine draw-down of resources and support is an accepted reality, what it may signal to national stakeholders is that humanitarian action is over, when in fact, the humanitarian programme cycle transitions into the defining part of any response: preparedness.

This important point tends to get lost in the artificial demarcation line drawn to separate humanitarian phase from long-term development—a division that serves to delineate agency duties and mandates more than provide affected households a meaningful transition from relief, to recovery, to resilience.

The efforts to institutionalize emergency CTP within the Government of the Philippines’ social protection agency, DSWD, as documented in this report, offer a great opportunity to see how this meaningful transition for the Yolanda-affected social safety net beneficiaries might look like.

With the Government taking ownership of protecting its vulnerable citizens in and out of an emergency, it’s all the more important now for humanitarian and development donors and actors to divest the assistance paradigm of their archetypal divide, and instead collaborate on investing in government preparedness and institutionalization activities, including supporting the development of CTP-friendly government policies.
References


5. UN OCHA, ‘Transformative Agenda’, <www.humanitarianresponse.info/topics/transformative-agenda>


12. Citation for the quote regarding DSWD Subsidy (Footnote no. 24)


14 Department of Social Welfare and Development, National Advisory Committee Guidance,


18. DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Programme, which implements CFW to restore livelihoods and provide immediate social protection to vulnerable, unemployed, underemployed, and displaced workers, and survivors of calamities (www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceld=51497)