**Secondary Data Review**

**Chad November 2011 (Focus on: Impact of Libya Crisis on Chad)**

- **Date of publication:** 05 December 2011
- **Prepared by:** OCHA CHAD
- **Nature of the crisis:** Impact of Libyan Crisis in Chad

**About this document:** This Secondary Data Review is a desk study in which estimates of scale, severity and likely impact of a natural or man-induced disaster are determined. Information has been gathered through a review of secondary data, assessment reports transmitted by field offices, contact with country key informants, use of lessons learned and experience from past similar crises.

**Disclaimer:** Information provided is provisional as it has not been possible to independently verify field reports. As this report covers highly dynamic subject, utility of the information may decrease with time.

**Purpose:** This Secondary Data Review (SDR) has been drafted in the context of the preparation of a coordinated multi-agency needs assessment on the impact of Libyan crisis in Faya Largeau and Oubianga Kebir in the northern department of Borkou, thus its focus. A comprehensive overview of Chad humanitarian situation can be found in “Chad Secondary Data Review, September 2011”

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**Crises Overview**

**General**
The impact of the Libyan crisis initiated in March 2011 is having humanitarian, economic and political consequences in Chad. Chad is confronted with the humanitarian and recovery needs of more than 85,000 returnees in a vulnerable context where food insecurity, poor provision of basic services and unemployment prevail. Besides, the crisis implies the sharp decrease of remittances, reduced commercial links and partial loss of foreign investment in a fragile economy. As far as security and politics are concerned, post-Qaddafi emerging regional dynamics threaten the precarious peace in eastern and northern Chad with an increased proliferation of weapons and the reinvigorated action of rebel groups.

**Humanitarian impact**
The deteriorating situation in Libya caught many migrant workers in a trap and they were forced to return to their country in difficult conditions. Returnees have reported abuse and theft of property by Libyan insurgents and citizens from the general population, who equated “blacks with mercenaries” ([ICG, 10/2011](http://example.com)).

According to estimates, before the crisis there were about 300,000 Chadian nationals in Libya ([ICG, 10/2011](http://example.com)). Between March and October 2011, approximately 85,000 Chadians have returned to Chad ([IOM, 10/2011](http://example.com)) either by plane or truck. Since March 2011, thousands of returnees started to arrive in the northern areas of Tibesti and Borkou, in precarious transport after weeks in the desert suffering from dehydration, sickness, hunger and abuse during the journey. Thousands also arrived by plane in N’Djamena in need of relief aid (mainly health, food and shelter) either in transit to their final destination or in arrival to N’Djamena.

Humanitarian relief assistance for these returnees (health, food, wash, shelter, protection) has been progressively provided by the humanitarian community present in Chad with the leadership of IOM in collaboration with Government authorities, UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross. The emergency assistance structures are in place and the main gaps reported in the first months seem to have been largely overcome, especially in areas where the presence of humanitarian actors was nearly non-existent before the onset of the Libyan crisis, such as the northern districts ([OCHA 3W, Dec 2010](http://example.com)).

While the immediate arrival of returnees has illustrated community solidarity and most migrants have been welcomed back in their communities, key informants fear mid-term difficulties in most cases to start economic activities without support. Psychosocial and trauma impact of the events may also arise in the form of family and community tensions ([IOM, 6/2011](http://example.com)).

Despite the violence, many Chadian migrants did not want to return to Chad and remained in Libya. Some of them were born in Libya or acquired Libyan nationality. The political changes ahead may create a threat to their continued presence in Libya ([ICG, 10/2011](http://example.com)).

**Economic impact**
The crisis in Libya threatens growth, employment and livelihoods in Chad. The impact of a halt to Libyan investment in Chad for an uncertain period of time and the absence of remittances previously sent by Chadian migrants who have now returned, threatens the economic outlook in short and medium term, particularly that of most vulnerable households. Besides the loss of remittances, host areas will need to integrate the returnees in a context of high vulnerability and food insecurity, particularly in Sahel and the East. Other areas such as the northern districts will likely confront stronger density of returnees and increasing competition for resources and poor basic services which could lead to community unrest ([ICG, 10/2011](http://example.com)).

Since 2002, Libya has made extensive investments in Chad. Libya’s interests were diverse and ranged from property, banking, construction, telecommunications, manufacturing to increasing agricultural and energy capacity. However, with the exception of SOTEL (Chad Communications Company), Libya has not invested in enterprises essential to Chad’s economy or the oil industry (Libya is only present in the distribution sectors through Oil Libya’s service stations).
The Chadian government is currently seeking funds to compensate for the halt to financial flows from Libya while increasing its own contribution to security related activities. On September 2011, the government adopted a bill amending the state’s general budget. This law increased state expenditure by CFA309 billion from CFA1,263 billion (+25%) to CFA1,572 billion. The Chadian government justified this increase by the “exceptional security expenditure” (deployment of troops to the north) required by the Libyan crisis and the provision of care for repatriated Chadians. Of this CFA309 billion increase, around CFA200 billion (65%) was allocated to just two ministries – Defence and Security. (ICG, 10/2011).

Security and Political impact
Chad may suffer political and security collateral effects from the Libyan crisis. There are three main risks:

- Proliferation of arms that could become a factor in destabilising the northern Chad (Toubou combatants) and other areas of regional Sahel.
- Instability along the very sensitive and strategic Chad-Libya border.
- A new round of destabilisation of eastern Chad caused by the return of armed actors to Darfur, which is already current.

Post-Qaddafi political scenarios between Libya and Chad (hostility, slow normalisation or rapid normalisation) and regional reconfiguration (Libya’s influence over Sahel region may or may not remain as a priority for Tripoli) will be uncertain until the new Libyan government stabilises the situation and defines its relations with its neighbours, especially those in the Sahel area. Although Chad and the NTC have announced that they want good relations it is still uncertain what the pace and solidity of the normalisation will be.

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Key Priorities

**Priority Needs**

**North**
- Emergency needs for newly arrived returnees.
- Sustainable livelihood resources.
- Access to basic services (WASH, Health, Education)
- Social integration in mid-term

**West Sahel**
- Emergency needs for newly arrived returnees.
- Sustainable livelihood resources (agricultural tools, microcredit, skills training)
- Access to basic services (WASH, Health, Education)
- Social integration in mid-term

**East**
- Emergency needs for newly arrived returnees.
- Sustainable livelihood resources (agricultural tools)
- Access to basic services (WASH, Health, Education)
- Social integration in mid-term

**N’Djamena**
- Emergency needs for newly arrived returnees.
- Sustainable livelihood resources.

Most affected areas

- **North**: Desert towns receiving a significant increase of population in a short period of time. Although the area is not considered as food insecure, the balance and coping mechanisms prevailing before the crisis could be affected. This remote area also faces poor provision of basic services.
- **West Sahel**: This region is an area of origin of many migrants due to prevailing socio economic vulnerabilities in the Sahel belt. The on-going nutrition crisis in the area will likely worsen as a result of poor rainfall registered during the last rainy season (Jun-Sep). Moreover, poor basic services, illustrate the limited absorption capacity in the region. Kanem Department is considered the most vulnerable hosting area.
- **East**: The conflict dynamics (IDPs and refugees) and insecurity issues remain a concern for the integration of yet another new group of population while the existing caseload of IDPs faces challenges for normalisation. However the area
offers more opportunities than West Sahel for returnees to start agricultural activities if support is provided (IOM, 6/2011).

- **N’Djamena**: While being the largest single destination point for returnees, the urban setting offers a number of possibilities for livelihood assistance. Absorption capacity is greater given the size of the capital (over 700,000 inhabitants). Besides, N’Djamena is considered a transit zone for many returnees (IOM, 6/2011).

### Most affected groups
- Returnees Female-Headed households
- Returnees, particularly those without social security nets or in transit
- Host families largely dependent on remittances for food purchase
- Host communities where concentration of returnees is higher

### Priority Interventions

#### North
- Maintain relief assistance during transit (arrival centres and way stations) to newly arrived returnees and continue registration in cooperation with authorities.
- Provide livelihood assistance to returnees and host communities considering vulnerability aspects of the community (Do no harm).
- Increase absorption capacity of basic community infrastructures (WASH, Health, Education).
- Monitor mid-term integration of returnees.

#### West Sahel
- Maintain relief assistance during transit (arrival centres and way stations) to newly arrived returnees and continue registration in cooperation with authorities.
- Provide livelihood assistance to returnees and host communities considering vulnerability aspects of the community (Do no harm).
- Increase absorption capacity of basic community infrastructures (WASH, Health, Education).
- Monitor mid-term integration of returnees.

#### East
- Maintain relief assistance during transit (arrival centres and way stations) to newly arrived returnees and continue registration in cooperation with authorities.
- Provide livelihood assistance to returnees and host communities considering vulnerability aspects of the community (Do no harm).

### Information gaps and needs
- While registration mechanisms allow to track returnees and 68% have been registered, there is uncertainty about the final destination of many of them who may have not been registered. Clarification on concentration of returnees should be sought in the northern districts.
- Integration of returnees represents a challenge in the prevailing vulnerability context. Mid-term integration of returnees, mainly in the northern districts and West Sahel, should be monitored.
- Prospects, livelihood strategies and plans of returnees to normalize in Chad are still unclear. Returnees and host families should be consulted about it and programmes should be designed accordingly.

### Recent and On-going assessments

The following list is certainly not exhaustive and is based only on information accessed and/or publicly available

A diversity of single agency and multi-agency needs assessments covering multi sector matters have been undertaken by the humanitarian community since the onset of the Libyan crisis. Most of these assessments are focused on emergency relief. FAO and some partners have started to collect data on livelihood integration in West Sahel and the East.

IOM conducted in June 2011 a rapid needs assessment on returnees’ impact and support required in all areas of the country except from the northern departments.

The HC has requested OCHA to assist in the preparation of a multi-agency needs assessment mission to the northern districts focusing on returnees’ integration and vulnerability reduction of host communities. The mission will gather primary data end of January 2012.

### Operational constraints

**North**: Access and logistics remain challenging to reach the desert area both for assistance and humanitarian staff. Limited presence of humanitarian actors. Security could worsen in
the area as a result of the post-Qaddafi dynamics due to proliferation of arms and reinvigorated action of rebels. Limited sustainable livelihood options. Poor managerial capacity of local authorities. Poor quality of basic service providers.

**West Sahel**: Structural food insecurity and nutrition crisis is set as a challenging background. Limited sustainable livelihood options and climate threats. Poor managerial capacity of local authorities. Poor quality of basic service providers. Limited presence of humanitarian actors.

**East**: Insecurity and conflict dynamics hamper humanitarian access and represent a challenge for the normalization of IDPs, Refugees and returnees alike.

### Affected population figures and location
- Chadian returnees from Libya: 85,000 (IOM, 10/2011)
- Host families (no data available)
- Host communities (not data available)

### Total population figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barth El Gazel</td>
<td>Moussoro</td>
<td>260,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batha</td>
<td>Ati</td>
<td>527,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borkou</td>
<td>Faya</td>
<td>97,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chari bagourmi</td>
<td>Massenya</td>
<td>621,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennedi</td>
<td>Fada</td>
<td>173,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guera</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>553,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjer Lamis</td>
<td>Massakory</td>
<td>562,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanem</td>
<td>Mao</td>
<td>354,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lac</td>
<td>Bol</td>
<td>451,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logone Occidental</td>
<td>Moundou</td>
<td>683,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logone Oriental</td>
<td>Doba</td>
<td>796,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandoul</td>
<td>Kourma</td>
<td>637,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo Kebbi East</td>
<td>Bongor</td>
<td>769,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo Kebbi West</td>
<td>Pala</td>
<td>565,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyen Chari</td>
<td>Sarh</td>
<td>598,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>Abeche</td>
<td>731,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Fira</td>
<td>Biltine</td>
<td>494,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamat</td>
<td>Am Timan</td>
<td>308,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sila</td>
<td>Goz Beida</td>
<td>289,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandjile</td>
<td>Lai</td>
<td>682,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibesti</td>
<td>Bardai</td>
<td>21,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’Djamena</td>
<td>N’Djamena</td>
<td>993,492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: 11,175,915

### Lessons Learned
- **Conflict sensitivity**: Livelihood support to returnees must consider the vulnerable context of host communities. The design of aid programmes should avoid generating unintended tensions and conflicts within the communities. Improvement of community infrastructure could be an appropriate component of aid programmes increasing absorption capacity, promoting integration and reduction of vulnerabilities of host communities.

- **Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Adaptation**: Given the vulnerability of agriculture livelihoods in host areas before drought and hydro-meteorological disasters exacerbated by climate change, the design of agricultural support and WASH services should integrate Disaster Risk Reduction and drought adaptation measures.

### Registration and Profiling
IOM Chad, in close cooperation with the Chadian Immigration Department and Local Authorities, employs a tracking and registration mechanism in order to gain a greater insight on profiles of Chadian returnees and TCN as well as to reliably register all arrivals since April 2011.

The network of registration points (Faya, Kalait, Ouainagar Kabir, Morudi, Mao, N’Djamena and Abeche) covers all main entry routes and therewith facilitates nearly complete registration coverage since it was started (May 2011). Registration points are not necessarily the entry points in Chad, they however coincide with Chadian official structures for immigration and custom clearance and represent regional hubs through which all traffic has to pass. Each individual is physically verified; including a review of his/her documents if available and immediately recorded in the IOM Chad Database. The collected data of each registration point is sent to N’Djamena on a bi-weekly basis. Data is then consolidated, analyzed and verified. UNHCR data from Faya (before April 21) has been consolidated in the IOM database.

During the registration process migrants are interviewed and are asked about their final
destination in Chad. Final destination figures are based on the statements of each individual. The drop off points are at the closest possible distance to the final destination of the returnees, who often return to small villages or hamlets.

The main final destinations indicated by returnees are: N’Djamena, Abeche, Mao, Bol, Am Timan, Goz Beida, Ati and Ounianga Kebir.

TABLE: IOM – Assistance per category group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of individuals</th>
<th>Level of Assistance</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-crisis Chadian population in Libya</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Estimated figure [ICG, 10/2011]</td>
<td>Estimation of all migrants arriving at main entry points in Chad [IOM, 10/2011]. Tracked data cannot be disaggregated per final destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracked migrants</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>WASH, Shelter, food, NFI, basic medical first aid, access to rescue trucks and medical evacuations</td>
<td>Started by IOM &amp; GoC in April 2011 Refers to all those arrivals who are registered by IOM at each Registration point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered migrants</td>
<td>56,688</td>
<td>Same package of assistance as “Tracked individuals” + psychosocial and protection assistance</td>
<td>All migrants assisted with in country transportation until the “drop off point” by IOM. Some returnees may have decided to stay in Ndjamena or move without IOM support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transported migrants (in country)</td>
<td>30,552</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table prepared by OCHA [IOM 10/2011, ICG 10/2011]

Migrant Profile [IOM, 06-10/2011]

- Trend: Peak of registration in April 2011 (26,551), followed by May 2011 (11,964). The lowest month was August 2011 (1,007). The slowing trend is consolidated although 4,000 people in Libya are waiting to be supported to return.
- Nationality: The majority of migrants are Chadian nationals (98,6%) and 1% is Sudanese.
- Gender: 89% of the migrants are male and 11% female
- Age: 80,4% are male between 18 to 59 and 6,6% female between 18 and 59; 7,8% are males under 18 and 5,2% female under 18
- Destination: The main destinations chosen by returnees are Sahel belt, N’Djamena and Northern areas.
- 99% of Chadian migrants in Libya were unskilled work force
- From 1,119 interviewed migrants up to June 2011, 92% indicated their intention to remain in Chad and seek employment

Scenarios

The table below presents 3 possible scenarios in Libya-Chad relations:

- 1.- Negative: Unlikely
- 2.- Slow normalisation : Very Likely
- 3.- Quick normalisation: Unlikely

Strategic regional interest and global alignment of new Libyan authorities indicate that, although far from the cooperative relationship Chad and Libya maintained during Qaddafi era, both countries share common interests that could forge future collaboration. However, the economic and political normalisation may suffer from the emotional legacy of the conflict delaying the process. No quick normalisation could be considered at this stage, advising therefore for external aid in support of returnees integration and early recovery.
General reference map of Chad

Source: OCHA 11/2007
Chad country Profile

Key indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>2.009% (CIA 2011 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>49.2 (DHI UNDP 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 mortality rate</td>
<td>209.0 [WHO 2009]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rate as deaths/100000 live births</td>
<td>1200.0 (MDG 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>15% (MDG update 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate in %</td>
<td>34% (WHO 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development Index</td>
<td>0.295 (HDI UNDP 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS age 15/49 prevalence rate in %</td>
<td>5.1 (MDG 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population as % of total population</td>
<td>28% of total population (CIA 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters Risk Index</td>
<td>medium risk (Prevention web 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key characteristics

- **Size/Total**: 1.284 million sq km, country comparison to the world: 21
- **Land cover**: 1,259,200 sq km, water: 24,800 sq km
- **Elevation**: Lowest point: Djourab 160 m, highest point: Emi Koussi 3,415 m
- **Geology**: Broad, arid plains in center, desert in north, mountains in northwest, lowlands in south
- **Environment**: Inadequate supplies of potable water; improper waste disposal in rural areas contributes to soil and water pollution; desertification (CIA 2011)
- **Infrastructures**:
  - Number and location of (air) ports: 56 (CIA 2010)
  - Road network: 33,400 km (CIA 2010)
  - Mobile cellular subscriptions: 2.686 million (CIA 2009)
  - Internet users in %: 1.2 ([IHD UNDP ])

Population characteristics

- **Social and cultural characteristics**
  69.9% of the population is active (MDG UNDP 2011). The unemployment rate is not available since 1993. 55% of the population lives below poverty line (urban/rural) (WHO 2003). The gross national income per capita is $ 600 (WHO 2010).

- **Ethnic groups**
  - Sara 27.7%, Arab 12.3%, Mayo-Kebbi 11.5%, Kanem-Bornou 9%, Ouaddai 8.7%, Hadjarai 6.7%, Tandjile 6.5%, Gorane 6.3%, Fitri-Batha 4.7%, other 6.4%, unknown 0.3% (Census 1993).

- **Language**
  - Muslim 53.1%, Catholic 20.1%, Protestant 14.2%, animist 7.3%, other 0.5%, unknown 1.7%, atheist 3.1% (1993 census)

- **Religion**
  - French (official), Arabic (official), Sara (in south), more than 120 different languages and dialects (CIA 2011)

Economic profile

Chad’s primarily agricultural economy continues to be boosted by major foreign direct investment projects in the oil sector that began in 2000. At least 80% of Chad’s population relies on subsistence farming and livestock rising for its livelihood. Chad’s economy has long been handicapped by its landlocked position, high energy costs, and a history of instability. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most public and private sector investment projects (CIA 2011).

Migrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net emigration (per 1,000 population)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2.46</td>
<td>-4.08</td>
<td>-3.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Index Mundi 2011)
Chad seasonal calendar

Source: VAM study done on the Sahel strip only WFP, 03/11

Chad main sources of livelihood, major food and cash crops by region:

Source: FEWSNET 2011

Chad hazard profile

Source: WFP Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch 01/2011 HEWS 2010