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SHELTER SECTOR RESPONSE MONITORING TYPHOON HAIYAN - Final Report: Monitoring Assessment 2 SEPTEMBER 2014

Subject/Objective: 
The overall objective of this assessment was to monitor the shelter sector response to Typhoon Haiyan. Specifically, the assessment aimed at understanding remaining needs of the affected population, the differing needs of vulnerable groups and outcomes of the shelter sector response. There was a strong focus on assessing the extent to which households were living in safe and adequate dwellings based on shelter recover guidelines developed by the cluster. This information is critical for the humanitarian community and more specifically, the shelter sector, to understand gaps in current assistance, progress in reference to the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) and the extent to which the affected population is ready to move into the recovery phase.
Methodology: 
This section describes the methodology that was developed and implemented for the shelter sector response monitoring assessment. The assessment methodology below outlines (a) the multi-stage sampling strategy designed and used for the assessment, including final sample size by municipality; (b) the data collection process, including an overview of data collection methods and tools; and (c) the representativeness and limitations of the data collected. See PDF for rest of methodology
Key findings: 
SHELTER SECTOR CONCLUSIONS Eight months after the devastating typhoon that hit the Central Philippines and led to an unprecedented humanitarian response for the country, recovery seems to have slowed and households have grown increasingly frustrated with the stagnation of assistance as longer-term assistance needs are not being met. As the previous monitoring assessment report described, initial emergency shelter assistance seems to have been successful in meeting immediate needs, but as additional assistance seems to have flowed to some of the same households, the scope of the recovery has been limited. The stagnation in recovery and the inability of assistance to meet current needs can be seen in both the results showing remaining visible damage and the reported self-recovery capacity of households. Objective damage assessments show that there has been little change in remaining visible damage levels in the affected area and, in fact there has been a slight increase in dwellings showing major damage or were categorised as totally destroyed. While some of this can be explained by the ongoing recovery process and the resulting demolition of houses, the lack of any increase in undamaged houses suggests that shelter recovery has not moved forward. Furthermore, households perceive their housing recovery capacity as diminishing when compared to the previous monitoring assessment, with an 86% decrease in households believing their housing recovery to be completed since the previous shelter response monitoring assessment conducted in March 2014. As housing recovery needs become more long-term, households feel that they increasingly lack the resources necessary to complete the housing recovery process. This perceived lack of capacity is also met with an increasingly dissatisfied population seen in the 47% increase in the proportion of households that report not being satisfied with the assistance they have received since the first monitoring assessment. Given the large percentage of the population that are still in real need of assistance according to their own assessment as well as objective enumerator assessments, this increasing dissatisfaction and frustration is not surprising, but is also a potential security issue that agencies should take into consideration moving forward. Beyond the satisfaction levels of the assisted population, the reality is that the outcome of the shelter assistance that has reached households has not led to minimum levels of safety or adequacy for much of the population. 76% of dwellings were objectively classified as still being very unsafe or fairly unsafe, while 39% were objectively classified as being very inadequate or inadequate. As households prepare for relocation, it will be important that existing vulnerabilities are accounted for and that agencies work with households to build back safer and change existing conceptions of what constitutes a safe or adequate dwelling, where necessary. Households continue to feel that their capacity to self-recover is limited and increasingly diminishing amounts of assistance continue to flow to the same locations at the possible expense of other locations more in need. If this continues, the humanitarian community runs the risk of the recovery process across the entire affected area remaining stagnated. SHELTER SECTOR RECOMMENDATIONS As with the findings of the assessment carried out in March there still remains considerable outstanding needs. This has become even more apparent now that the response is firmly in the recovery phase. It was agreed at the beginning of the response that the priority need was for maximum coverage with the focus being on support to self-recovery. Although wide coverage was achieved in the emergency phase this has very much slowed in the recovery phase, understandable, to a degree, given recovery shelter programmes take longer to plan and implement. However with areas such as Samar and Eastern Samar evidently requiring additional support to recover there is not only a clear need for more assistance but there also needs to be an increased awareness around comprehensive targeting so as to safeguard against duplication in assistance and to reach those that are the most socially and economically vulnerable. This assessment also shows a heightened need for technical assistance, training and building back safer messaging especially to those who receive shelter repair kits. Additionally such information and support should also be made more widely available to those households who may not be included in any assistance programmes, thus helping to create a broader understanding and knowledge generation around building back safer and ensuring that self-recovery can also lead to more resilient structures being built. Moreover communication planning and support should also be provided to DSWD at the municipal level so as to ensure build back safer messages are incorporated in the delivery of its Emergency Shelter Assistance and National Community Driven Programmes. The comparison in this assessment between purported ‘no build zones’ and non-no build zones shows that there is a continued need to work closely with relevant LGUs in identifying households in no build zones that can be provided with temporary assistance. Additionally the continued lack of land for the Government’s resettlement programme means that partners who are looking to support those stuck in these areas will also need to be flexible in their programmatic approaches. Advocacy at the local level must continue for those who remain in purported no build zones especially around preparedness measures such as early warning systems and evacuation routes and centres. Given the uncertainty around resettlement such measures should be designed for the long term and not just as a temporary fix. Finally given the results around safety and adequacy consideration must be given to capacity building of LGUs so as to ensure a robust system of monitoring is put in place and enacted upon.
Assessment Report: 
Assessment Questionnaire: 
Not Available
Assessment Data: 
Publicly Available
Webspace(s): 
Assessment Date(s): 
30 Sep 2014
Status: 
Report completed
Population Type(s): 
All affected population
Leading/Coordinating Organization(s): 
Government of the Philippines - Department of Social Welfare and Development
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
International Organization for Migration
REACH Initiative
Location(s): 
Philippines
Disaster(s)/Emergency: 
Typhoon Haiyan - Nov 2013